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ABSTRACT 
In the near future, commanders and their respective staffs will interact with 
subordinate and opposing forces whose physical and cognitive behaviors are represented 
in software and simulation.  This paper presents a model of the human factors and 
environmental variables that influence stress and risk assessment.  These variables 
contribute to situational awareness, which is a force protection issue. 
Leaders integrate information from various sources.  These sources range from 
observations, training, orders, and reports.  The leaders use this knowledge with doctrine 
and tactics to develop an understanding of the situation.  This paper describes a Bayesian 
network model of the variables associated with risk assessment and stress in combat 
scenarios.  The level of situational awareness is determined by what the commander 
knows about the unit and the surrounding conditions.  This model lends structure to the 
environment and enables a probabilistic interpretation of risk and stress levels.  This 
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This paper presents a model of the human factors and environmental variables 
that influence stress and risk assessment.  These variables contribute to situational 
awareness, which is a force protection issue.  Leaders integrate information from various 
sources.  These sources range from observations, training, orders, and reports.  The 
leaders use this knowledge with doctrine and tactics to develop an understanding of the 
situation.  This paper describes a Bayesian network model of the variables associated 
with risk assessment and stress in combat scenarios.  The level of situational awareness is 
determined by the commander’s knowledge of the unit and surrounding conditions.  This 
model lends structure to the environment and enables a probabilistic interpretation of risk 
and stress levels.  This model is applicable to various combat scenarios ranging from 
brief engagements to sustained operations. 
With the rapid development of sophisticated equipment and weapon systems, 
today's combat systems are lethal and complex.  Therefore, the human ability to master 
these systems and incorporate them into the decision-making process must grow 
proportionally to the rate of the ongoing battle.  Regardless of whether the unit is combat 
arms (such as infantry, armor, or artillery) or combat services support (ranging from 
ordnance, quartermaster, or transportation) the unit must be thoroughly trained in certain 
tasks in order to complete the mission and make sure that it is successful in battle.  Safety 
and combat effectiveness are two elements of force protection that have not been 
adequately addressed in the past.  By considering human factors, we can enhance force 
protection.  Part of ensuring safety and combat effectiveness is good situational 
awareness.  Modern leaders have difficulty keeping track of all the variables and 
complexities required for good situational awareness.  The complexity and structure of 
this environment can be graphically modeled with Bayesian networks to enhance 
situational awareness. 
This thesis takes into account pertinent factors such as logistics, physical fitness, 
threat, planning, risk assessment, mission, stress, performance and duration of the 
operation.  The model can be modified depending on threat, location, and mission.  
Probabilities for events occurring for each node in the model have been assigned based 
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on experience and beliefs.  This model is designed to help leaders gain a better 
understanding of their environment and how it affects risk and stress.  The model should 
give leaders insight into expected levels of stress and risk.  This model considers 
numerous factors; however, there are other variables that may affect risk and stress, 





The military services recognize the importance of improving unit training, 
personnel, equipment, tactical doctrine, weapon systems and ergonomics.  In general, the 
United States Army notes that accurate measurements of combat effectiveness are vital to 
the following objectives: (1) determining the combat readiness of units; (2) assessing and 
evaluating the training of units and identifying needs for follow on training; (3) 
identifying improvements in doctrine, training, organization, material, and leadership that 
will contribute to greater success on the battlefield. 
Regardless of whether one is from the French Foreign Legion or Merrill's 
Marauders, as time progresses, the military relies on actual combat to evaluate their 
leadership, training, and organization. For example, in 1876, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) 
George Custer marches into Little Big Horn Valley with the 7th Cavalry.  Unfortunately, 
LTC Custer does not know that 4,000 angry Indians are waiting to meet the 7th Cavalry.  
Ultimately, Custer's command is destroyed.  Ironically, history repeats itself almost 100 
years later in 1965.  Now it is Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore.  He moves 7th Cavalry into 
the Ia Grang Valley in North Vietnam.  There he engages 4,000 angry North Vietnamese.  
The only difference is that LTC Moore is successful in his engagement.  How does LTC 
Moore know what to do?  Maybe he is familiar with LTC Custer and the engagement at 
Little Big Horn.  The military does not like to repeat its mistakes.  LTC Hal Moore 
studies the scenario and the history of the Ia Grang Valley in North Vietnam.  He realizes 
the similarities of this mission with respect to those of LTC George Custer in the Battle 
of Little Big Horn Valley.  LTC Moore knows that he must not repeat the steps of LTC 
Custer or the engagement would be an automatic loss.  Studying the history aids in his 
success in the battle.  (Knowledge from books is an asset in making sure that leaders do 
not make the same mistake). 
History cannot always prepare us for future battles.  Changes in equipment, 
soldiers, and doctrine often make many historical lessons of limited utility. Leaders must 
rely on realistic training in order to prepare for modern battle.  The problem is that the 
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more realistic the training, the more costly it is to perform.  Thus it is vital to develop 
another method of enlightening leaders on various aspects of engagements while 
minimizing the cost.  The Bayesian network model in this thesis is designed to help 
junior leaders understand the situation and to give senior leaders timely information so as 
not to repeat mistakes.  Obviously, LTC Hal Moore modeled in his mind what was 
required to take place and when it was to occur so that he would not go down in history 
with LTC Custer.  With the improvement of technology, DOD has worked to develop 
models and simulators to cut down on the cost of actual training.  Unfortunately, many 
analysts have developed models that "capture the combat capabilities of one service at a 
time" (Powers, 1998). Models that reflect the capabilities of all services are required in 
order to have a more complete representation of the battlefield. 
The model in this thesis is an initial effort to incorporate the capabilities of all 
services using a Bayesian Network. With the rapid development of sophisticated 
equipment and weapon systems, today's combat systems are lethal and complex.  
Therefore, the human ability to master these systems and incorporate them into the 
decision-making process must grow proportiona lly to the rate of the ongoing battle.  As 
time has progressed, military research seeks to find the relationship between training for 
combat and many other variables. Two such variables are unit performance (based on 
human influence) and direction by the commander.  Regardless of whether the unit is 
combat arms (such as infantry, armor, or artillery) or combat service support (ranging 
from ordnance, quartermaster, or transportation) the unit must be thoroughly trained in 
certain tasks in order to complete the mission and make sure that it is successful for the 
overall battle.  Safety and combat effectiveness are two elements of force protection that 
have not been adequately addressed by leaders in the past.  By considering human 
factors, we can enhance force protection.  Part of ensuring safety and combat 
effectiveness is good situational awareness.  Modern leaders are stretched to keep track of 
all the variables and complexities associated with good situational awareness.  The 
complexity of this environment can be modeled with Bayesian networks.  In return, the 
model will give leaders valuable insights into issues such as human performance, stress 
and risk. 
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A. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
 
1. The Statement of the Problem 
The development of combat models and combat simulations do not accurately 
represent human factors and the impact that they have on combat operations. 
 
2. The Hypothesis 
The development of this Bayesian Network model will improve situational 
awareness, enhance decision-making capabilities, and will improve the ability of leaders 
to consider issues of operational tempo and risk which are key force protection issues. 
 
3. The Scope  
This thesis will focus primarily on the development of a Bayesian network that 
incorporates the various aspects of human performance, risk and combat effectiveness 
that are considered vital to a unit's performance. 
 
4. Assumptions  
The Bayesian network model is fluid.  This model changes in accordance with the 
stated mission and the factors involved with particular unit(s) and mission(s). 
The conditional probabilities are based on expert opinion, documented data, and 
doctrine for the US Army.  For instance, in the Node Fitness Level, Army doctrine states 
that the unit will maintain a unit readiness of 90%.  Thus for the state of Fitness Level 1 
(the worst case for physical fitness), in the absence of any information, the probability of 
10% was given. 
Doctrine governs what percentage of readiness is necessary for success of the 
mission.  A readiness level of 90% governs certain nodes such as Fitness Level, Logistics, 
Threat, and Risk Assessment.  For instance, if vehicles are not 90% mission capable, then 
the unit is not considered to be fully functional and may not be deployed. 
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5. Importance of the Study 
Decision-makers may use this model in the development of an algorithm/program 
that will enhance decision-making capabilities that are necessary given a particular 
mission or scenario.  The Bayesian network model represents the variables associated 
with stress and risk assessment and how they impact our combat operations.  The 
network can be adapted to accommodate various scenarios from all services ranging from 
















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
Prior to its recognition as a formal field of study, psychological principles were 
applied in organizational settings.  It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that 
psychologists began studying workplace behavior (Smither, 1998).  One of the critical 
reasons for examining workplace behavior was, and still is, the desire to improve human 
performance.  People work together in complex organizations that have a variety of 
goals.  Organizational goals influence how people behave, but people bring their own 
objectives, ideas, and patterns of behavior to organizations.  Therefore, the study of the 
psychology of work is important to organizational effectiveness.   
The U. S. Army has attempted to determine how various aspects of the 
environment, including stress, influence human behavior.  The U.S. Army Research 
Institute (ARI) initiated a major research program designed to better understand the 
effects of stress on Army units.  This research focused on training conducted at the 
National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center. 
Since the 1990's, one of the primary missions of the U. S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences has been to conduct research and develop 
methods to maximize the performance and effectiveness of combat units.  Even though 
ARI has increased its emphasis on unit-collective training research, it recognizes that the 
army fights in a unit consisting of a group of soldiers of varied backgrounds and cultures.  
ARI's research on unit collective training has not been without challenges.  Some of the 
challenges to be considered are: 
1) The development of reliable measurement methods and technologies for 
assessing unit performance effectiveness, 
2)  Determining the effects of soldier courage in combat, 
3) Ensuring that Army doctrine keeps up with technological advances and 
capitalizes on them, and 
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4) Maximizing the training opportunities with advanced technology while 
minimizing the cost of this training. 
Despite these challenges, the US Army seeks to understand the relationship 
between preparation for combat and unit performance effectiveness.  Most research and 
study efforts have been designed to explain individual performance by using individual 
factors, such as mental aptitude scores.  The challenge for the military is to understand 
unit effectiveness.  Human behavior will determine the outcome of a battle and must be 
considered. 
 
B. THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN COMBAT 
In preparation for combat, there is more than just technical and tactical training of 
soldiers.  Other factors, which may be considered when preparing soldiers for combat, are 
morale, motivation, esprit de corps, fear, courage, and the anxiety levels of individual 
soldiers.  These are critical to the conduct of warfare.  The Army Research Institute has 
conducted a vast amount of research to measure the effects of soldier morale, motivation, 
and cohesion on performance outcomes in simulated combat. 
Military leaders know that courage is the heart of a soldier's combat performance.  
Courage is a soldier's fortitude, inner strength, and will to persevere despite fear and the 
adverse conditions of combat.  A person can learn to fire a rifle and use military 
equipment; however, this alone does not make a soldier.  A soldier's courage is molded 
by Army values and training principles, which help develop his spirit and his relationship 
with his comrades (Ozkaptan, 1994). 
The role of man in combat was the obsession of COL Ardant du Picq.  The 
quotation characterizes his beliefs.  
"…never for a second did Ardant du Picq forget that combat is the object, 
the cause of being, the supreme manifestation of armies.  Every measure 
therefrom, which relegates it to the middle ground is deceitful, chimerical, fatal.  
All the resources accumulated in time of peace, all the tactical evolutions, all the 
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strategical calculations are but conveniences, drills, and reference marks to lead 
up to it” (du Picq, 1921). 
The primary focus of COL du Picq was the human dimension of the battlefield.  
He believed that man is an incomparable instrument whose elements, character, 
sentiments, fears, energies, instincts, and desires are stronger than the rules and theories, 
which we use when we engage in battle. Experts and simulators have made great strides 
since the time of Ardant du Picq who set the stage in modeling human characteristics on 
the battlefield.  Today, we are able to obtain and model information and data at rapid 
rates.  COL Ardant du Picq observed that while all other circumstances alter as time 
progresses, human limitations remain the same.  Humans are capable of only so much 
endurance, sacrifice, and effort. 
The Defense Modeling and Simulation Organization (DMSO) proposed a 
framework to model human behavior to meet short, intermediate, and long-term goals.  
Four elements were considered.  These are:  1) collect and disseminate human 
performance data, 2) develop accreditation procedures for human behavior models, 3) 
support sustained model development in focused areas, and 4) support theory 
development and basic research in necessary areas. 
For the first element, the DMSO wanted to extend results from laboratory studies 
of basic human capacities to the way military forces actually behave.  The main goals are 
to: 
· support the development of accreditation procedures, 
· compare model outputs in validation studies with target performance, 
· set the guidelines of the actual models of real-world taskings, 
· test and evaluate the effectiveness of those models, and 
· challenge the existing theory to lead researchers to new concepts that will 
provide the basis for future models. 
An ancillary goal would be to have data that could be shared and applicable to all 
branches of the military. 
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For the second element, DMSO has established a formal procedure for accrediting 
human behavior models.  After measuring human performance quantitatively, the 
modeler should determine the cost-effectiveness of incorporating the various aspects of 
human performance into alternative models.  The objective is to create a method that 
would provide for human behavior representation in military combat models.  The 
accreditations should include: 
· demonstration and verification, 
· validation, 
· analysis, 
· documentation, and  
· summary. 
For the third element, the modeler should use task analysis and structure.  This 
will establish the model's purpose.  For this task analysis, interdisciplinary teams should 
be used and benchmarks should be specified. 
For the fourth element, there is a requirement for continued support of theory 
development and basic research in areas such as decision-making, situational awareness, 
learning and organizational modeling.  The United States continually strives to move 
forward in technological development so that our country can defend itself and minimize 
threat.  We need to support future generations of models in order to provide insight to the 
technological advances taking place. 
Based on the four goals listed above, progress has been made in developing 
reliable measurement methods and technologies for assessing unit performance 
effectiveness (Holz, 1994).  However, additional improvements can always be made.  
The Bayesian network model in this thesis is an effort to apply existing probabilistic 
theory to the modeling of human behavior. 
 
C. BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
Since the early 1990s, Bayesian networks have attracted a great deal of attention 
from research as well as industrial applications.  To effectively exploit their use, 
Bayesian networks require theoretical insight and practical experience.  The Bayesian 
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network concept began in the late 1960s where the first expert systems were developed.  
An expert system is a point of view based on a person and that person's area of expertise 
such as a pilot flying an aircraft.  The concept was that experts could be replaced by 
computer systems that are modeling the experts in their field throughout the world. 
The rules began with some basic building blocks for modeling.  The condition 
was a logical expression or rule such as if condition then fact or if condition then action 
(Jensen, 1996).  The combination of the knowledge base and inference system 
(deductions) developed the rule-based system.  A set of these rules develops the 
knowledge base while the inference system utilizes rules and observations to think of 
conclusions for a state within a particular job or area of expertise. 
In mathematical concepts, a Bayesian network is a graphical representation of the 
joint probability distributions for a set of discrete variables.  The representation consists 
of a directed acyclic graph.  The probability assigned to each node is the conditional 
probability given the parents of that node. 
The graphical representation makes Bayesian networks a flexible tool for 
constructing models of uncertainty, which show relationships between variables.  
Specifications of probabilities are focused on small parts of the model.  In this model, 
Threat is related to Operational Tempo, which is related to Sleep Condition.  The state of 
some variables remains constant.  For example, during Task Force Smith, the Threat 
during the operation remains constant.  In the Battle of Midway, the node for Weather 
stays the same throughout the duration of the battle.  Once a variable is instantiated, 
marginals are computed and the conditional probabilities for each variable are updated. 
Algorithms/programs are developed for probability updating.  They perform very 
efficiently on a large variety of models (Shenoy and Shafer).  This is what makes 
Bayesian networks well suited for probabilistic inference and diagnosing.  This Bayesian 
network is a graphical representation of the variables associated with human factors. 
When we engage in battle, our human limitations can influence the outcome of 
battle, regardless of our level of training or knowledge of doctrine.  Present-day 
battlefields tend to be nonlinear and dynamic.  It is the dynamic nature of the current 
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battlefield that leads to more uncertainty in the decision-making process.  Leaders must 
be able to leverage technology in order to keep pace with system developments and the 
rapidly changing face of the modern battlefield.  Bayesian Networks can enhance a 
leader's ability to conduct probabilistic reasoning to deal with the uncertainty associated 
with the rapid changes taking place. 
 
D. MODELS OF HUMAN FACTORS 
Human factors are the interaction of people with equipment, environment, and 
other specified conditions (MSRR, 2002).  Human participation and influence permeates 
combat.  The effects of human performance are frequently considered only implicitly, if 
at all in combat models.  As a result, there has been a need for better representation of the 
human element in combat models.  The majority of the current analytic combat models 
have provided a better representation of equipment capabilities than the human 
component of the weapon system.  Biomechanics helps design systems that utilize human 
physical strengths and disregard the weaknesses.  "Biomechanics uses laws of physics 
and engineering concepts to describe motion undergone by the various body segments 
and the forces acting on these body parts during normal daily activities (Eliason, 1999)."  
This field incorporates the effects of fatigue, stress, and environmental factors on human 
performance. 
The Center of Army Analysis (CAA) has collected data on human performance in 
the field.  They have developed a data source that is called the Model Effectiveness as a 
Function of Personnel (ME = f(PER)).  The project encompasses areas that model the 
battlefield processes to include the effects of human factors and human performance.  
The purpose of this project is to identify those areas in which the modeling of battlefield 
processes in the Center of Army Analysis could and should be adapted to include the 
effects of human factors and human performance.  The collected data demonstrated that 
human factors affects combat.  Therefore, the Force Evaluation Model (FORCEM) could 
be modified to reflect the detrimental effects of environment and stress on humans.  Also, 
this project shows that preprocessing and sensitivity testing should be used to evaluate 
the effects of soldier characteristics such as mental status, which does not change greatly 
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during the combat period.  The results were a list of variables that should be included in 
combat models, an implementation plan for the list, and another list of important 
variables that requires additional testing before it can be incorporated. 
ME=f(PER) is not a simulation.  It is a model that collects data on the effects of 
human factors and human performance.  By collecting actual data, the military can learn 
to incorporate these factors into their work environment and training.  This will give 
researchers a better understanding of how to train soldiers to prepare them for battle. 
In June of 1998, the Human Research and Engineering Directorate of the US 
Army Research Laboratory developed the Improved Performance Research Integration 
Tool (IMPRINT).  IMPRINT is a model that incorporates human factors.  The model is a 
stochastic network tool.  Performance time, operational missions, and maintenance 
support are connected in a network.  Profiles for the soldiers are created so that their 
work distributions are recorded and examined.  The system will collect data on the high 
and low points of their work distributions during the exercise.  IMPRINT monitors the 
personnel characteristics, environmental stressors, and training frequency during the 
exercise (IMPRINT, 2000).  The system requirements refer to "soldier-driven 
constraints" of equipment design.  It uses the collected data from soldier performance 
within the new system.  Then it estimates what is necessary in making the system better.  
During the simulation, IMPRINT utilizes task analysis, decision-making, and personnel 
characteristics (IMPRINT, 2000). 
Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) incorporates soldier and unit 
needs throughout the entire system acquisition process and life cycle.  This program was 
designed to improve the effectiveness of system performance at minimum cost to 
personnel, maintenance and repairs.  MANPRINT integrates 7 key features:  manpower, 
personnel, training, human factors, system safety, health hazards and soldier survivability 
(MANPRINT, 2000). 
Dr. John Weisz, Director of the US Army Human Engineering Laboratory at 
Aberdeen Proving Ground in the 1960's stated that "we can no longer afford to develop 
equipment and merely hope that the necessary manpower can be found to operate and 
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maintain it in a relatively short time.  The cost of training and time available to conduct it 
on a mass basis may not permit this process under wartime conditions."  MANPRINT 
was developed because two problems continuously surfaced.  First, when soldiers used a 
new system, the actual field performance did not meet the desired standards during the 
development.  Next, replacing an older weapon system with a more complex one often 
required more personnel to operate, maintain, and support the system (MANPRINT, 
2000). 
With the advancement of weapon systems in the early 1980s, there were concerns 
about sustainability, mobilization, and readiness.  General Walter Kerwin and General 
George Blanchard decided that human performance assessments were not integrated in 
the systems.  During the design stage of the acquisition process for the system, human 
performance was ignored. General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that 50% of the 
equipment failures were due to human error.  This illustrated the need to integrate 
manpower, personnel and training with the development of the system (MANPRINT, 
2000). 
E. MODELS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
In July 1995, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated, "Risk Management is the 
Army's principle risk-reduction process to protect the force.  Our goal is to make risk 
management a routine part of planning and executing operational mission."  At this point, 
the US Army redefines its standard for risk management.  The leadership, regardless of 
the level of authority, would make informed decisions to minimize the risks and control 
the hazards.  Leaders now became responsible for properly assessing their mission or 
operation as a total system.  They would also make sure that the planning, risk 
management decisions, and execution would include verifying the hazards, considering 
the associated risks, and implementing control measures necessary to reduce the risk 
level. 
Risk management became a priority in the late 1980s (Safety Center, 2002).  The 
US Army has compiled pamphlets, reference cards and guides books for the senior 
leaders to minimize risk in various situations, whether at the workplace or in the field. 
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Of course, most operations and missions have a degree of risk.  The level of 
authority for making decisions on operations that include high levels of risk are 
established prior to an operation.  Thresholds are set that direct commanders to different 
levels of authority, depending on the level of risk.  To clarify, if there are no resources 
available to control a high risk, then the issue must be brought to the attention of the 
higher command.  The leader is to continue up the chain of command until there is level 
of command that has the ability to eliminate or control the hazard.  Then the decision can 
be made as to whether or not to commit to the mission (Safety Center, 2002). 
Risk management is a 5-step problem-solving process based on the standard 
Army decision-making process.  These steps are to be integrated in the decision-making 
process.  The main points of risk management are 1) to identify hazards and 2) to develop 




Figure 1.   Risk Management Model 
 
1.  Identify the hazards.  Hazards are conditions that lead to accidents.  Identifying 
possible hazards is the first step to prevent the loss of combat power, injured soldiers, or 
damaged equipment (Leader's Force Protection Card, 1995).  An example would be 
driving M1 Abrams tanks on icy roads.  
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2.  Assess the hazards.  Determine how badly the identified hazards can affect the 
mission.  There is a risk assessment card at most units that measures the level of risk.  An 
example of a risk assessment card is located in Appendix N (Leader's Force Protection 
Card, 1995).  Continuing with the example above we would use the risk assessment card 
and score the risk value of driving on the ice with the tank. 
3.  Select Controls and Make a Decision.  Leaders must eliminate unnecessary 
risks.  The leader must find the balance between benefits to be gained from the mission 
and the potential costs to the mission (Leader's Force Protection Card, 1995). For our 
example, the leader needs to determine how to prevent sliding when driving the tanks. 
4.  Implement Controls.  Control measures are part of the operations order.  
Leaders need to make sure that all soldiers are aware of the potential hazards and the 
control measures that reduce the risk (Leader's Force Protection Card, 1995).  In this 
case, the leader needs to have some of the rubber track pads removed.  This will increase 
traction similar to snow chains on a car. 
5.  Supervise.  A strong command climate, good discipline, and thorough training 
will reduce the risks associated with operations.  Reinforcement of control measures will 
protect the force from accidental losses (Leader's Force Protection Card, 1995).  To see if 
the unit followed instructions, the leader should check the vehicles for compliance. 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army has had more deployments than 
in previous 40 years.  Our deployment rate has increased by 13-fold (Safety Center, 
2002).  The Army's overall air and ground accident rates have decreased dramatically.  
The Army’s risk management program has made a significant contribution towards 








F. MODELS IN STRESS 
Stress is any demand (such as a force, pressure, or strain that is placed on the 
body) as well as the body's reaction to these demands.  Everyone experiences stress at 
some point in his or her life.  People cope with stress differently.  When people refer to 
stress, it usually has a negative connotation.  As people are threatened or challenged in 
situations, the reactions or feelings that are encountered are described as stress.  Stress 
reactions are not necessarily all negative.  Some stress is required for survival, but after a 
long period of time, it could have an adverse effect on the body. 
Research in this area has dealt with the body's reaction to stress and cognitive 
processes that are influenced by stress.  People who experience similar situations in life 
do not react the same.  Therefore, stress levels are different from person to person 
(Pearlin, 1982).  Because of these factors, stress is being re-evaluated. 
People show the effects of stress in numerous ways.  Some examples of things 
that can be affected are personal and work relationships.  Examples of things that cause 
stress are taking an exam or driving in rush hour traffic.  The Biopsychosocial Model of 
Stress (Bernard & Krupat, 1994) was designed to incorporate these various factors.  This 
model is based on three components.  They are: 1) external 2) internal and 3) the 
interaction between the external and internal components (Cordon, 1997). 
The external component involves environmental events that trigger and release a 
stress response.  Examples include times when a person feels aggravated, pressured, or 
are in conflict.  Usually, these feelings belong in one of four categories (Cordon, 1997).  
They are personal, social/family, work, or the environment.  For instance, a person does 
not work well with a fellow peer.  They constantly have disagreements during the day.  
At least one of the two people will have increased health problems such as ulcers or 
nausea until the issues are resolved (Bernard & Krupat, 1994).  If the situation is not 
resolved soon, chronic stressors can pose a serious health risk because of the prolonged 
manifestations of stress in the body. 
Secondly, the internal component deals with a set of neurological and 
physiological reactions to stress (Cordon, 1997).  According to Hans Selye, stress is 
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"nonspecific."  While a person experiences prolonged stress, he/she will go through three 
internal phases.  They are Alarm, Resistance, and Exhaustion phases (Selye, 1985).  This 
is also known as General Adaptation Syndrome (GAS).  In this situation, the person will 
engage all resources to deal with the impending problem or threat.  In the first stage of 
Alarm, the body begins a "fight-or- flight" response (Cordon, 1997).  This is a 
neurological and physiological response that confronts the stressor.  Basically, the body 
goes through a series of system checks to increase the metabolism and energy of the 
person.  In the second stage, Resistance, you experienced a heightened state of arousal 
(Cordon, 1997).  If this state lasts for too long, then the high level of hormones becomes 
detrimental to the internal organs leaving the person vulnerable to illness.  The third 
stage, Exhaustion, occurs after prolonged stress.  At this point, the body has relinquished 
all energy reserves and begins to break down (Cordon, 1997).  Examples of stress-
induced illness include headaches, insomnia, high blood pressure, and coronary disease. 
The third component is the interaction between the external and internal factors.  
This involves the individual's cognitive processes.  This component focuses on the 
interaction between the individual and the environment (Cordon, 1997).  The emphasis is 
primarily on the meaning of the event for the individual and not the physiological 
response.  In other words, it is how the person views whether the situation is stressful or 
not.  For example, when encountering a potential bomb, an explosive ordnance disposal 
unit will not experience as much stress as a person with no experience diffusing bombs.  
Overall, the way an individual views the situation determines the magnitude of the stress 
response. 
The Holmes-Rahe Scale (Appendix B) measures stressful life events.  If any of 
the events listed have occurred in the person's life within the last 12 months, then the 
person checks the block next to the event.  A score is associated with each event. The 
total scores for the indicated events are then tallied and a total score is given.  The grand 
total indicates how stressful the past year has been.  Thresholds are set for different levels 
of stress.  They are 1) a score less than 150 is low, 2) a score between 150 and 299 is in 
the middle, and 3) a score greater than 300 is high.  By taking this simple test, leaders 
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may become aware of personal problems and stress that may be hindering a soldier's 
performance.  Leaders can take action accordingly to assist the soldier (APFRI, 2002). 
The primary models mentioned earlier, that are presently used in measuring 
human performance, also incorporate risk assessment as well as stress.  Those models are 
Model Effectiveness as a Function of Personnel, Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation, and 
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III. METHODS 
A. THE MODEL 
The primary task in model building is to identify variables that affect the mission 
and to understand how these variables interact with each other.  Bayesian networks are 
one modeling technique that provides a graphical representation for handling domains of 
inherent uncertainty.  The purpose of a Bayesian network is that its purpose is to give 
probabilities for events of variables that are either not observable (or only observable at 
an unacceptable cost).  The task becomes to identify the types of information available to 
the modeler, which may reveal something about the state of the variables.  Afterwards, 
the primary focus is to determine which events have a direct causal impact on other 
variables. 
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclical graphical model.  The graphical model 
has nodes that represent random variables and provide decision makers with a notion of 
dependence.  Bayesian networks are subsumed by influence diagrams, which are 
commonly used to make decisions based on probabilistic reasoning and values of 
expected outcomes.  The Bayesian network is one tool that allows decision makers to 
model the concepts and ideas of today's battlefield. 
With combat systems being faster, more lethal and  sophisticated than ever before, 
the present-day battlefield tends to be nonlinear and more dynamic.  This dynamic nature 
leads to increased uncertainty in the decision-making process.  Leaders must be able to 
leverage technology in order to keep pace with system developments and the rapidly 
changing face of the modern battlefield.  Bayesian networks can enhance a leader's 
reasoning ability to accommodate probabilistic and rapid decision-making.  This allows 
the leader to deal with the uncertain reasoning associated with the brisk pace of the 
changes that are taking place. 
Decision-makers may use this project in the development of an algorithm that will 
enhance the decision-making capabilities that are necessary for a particular mission or 
scenario.  The Bayesian network model represents a range of important human factors 
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and describes how these human factors may impact combat operations.  The network can 
accommodate various scenarios ranging from short battles to long-term sustained 
operations. 
This graphical model combines probability and graph theory.  Uncertainty and 
complexity are the two problems that occur throughout missions, which continue to play 
an important role in combat systems and analysis.  The model takes into account 
variables such as physical fitness, risk assessment, environmental factors, logistics, 
threat, and duration of the mission.  The model can be modified to add or subtract 
variables based on the upcoming mission.  The variables are connected in a directed 
acyclic graph and take into account prior knowledge.  This representation allows decision 
makers to make explicit what they would normally do tacitly.  To a novice, a Bayesian 
network can provide valuable insight and may serve as a training tool.  This graphical 
representation can also offer valuable insight to experienced decision makers allowing 
them to take many variables into account simultaneously.  As stated by Michael Jordan in 
1998, "The graphical model framework provides a way to view all of these systems as 
instances of common underlying formalism." 
The model is tested using three well-known scenarios from historical battles that 
are often used in training.  The scenarios are Task Force Smith, The Battle of Midway, 











B. THE NODES 
 
Figure 2.   Generic Model of Bayesian Network for Stress and Risk Assessment 
 
This model involves 41 nodes.  There are four critical nodes, Risk Assessment, 
Leadership Effectiveness, Stress, and Performance. These four primary nodes are the 
focus of this model.  The parent nodes, Leadership Effectiveness and Stress, flow into 
their child node, Performance.  Risk Assessment flows into Stress.  Risk Assessment is 
central to this model.  The nodes represent factors that may be considered prior to a battle 
or during a battle.  There are numerous possibilities to be considered in developing this 
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model.  In all, these 41 nodes are just a handful of the variables that may be considered 
during a battle. 
First we will begin with a brief introduction to leadership effectiveness.  Field 
studies give the researcher data on the relationship between a leader and superior.  The 
leader's intellectual abilities are utilized best in situations where the relationship between 
leader and superior are relatively free of stress.  When the relations are stressed, the more 
intelligent leaders make poorer decisions than those with lower intelligence.  Stress 
strongly affects how effectively you think on your feet versus making a calculated 
decision.  Interpersonal stress diverts the individual's focus from the task to the troubled 
relationship.  The leader may then spend time contemplating the consequences of failure, 
the need to avoid the superior, or how to find another job.  These thought processes divert 
the leader's intellectual effort from the task and thus lower the relationship between 
leader intelligence and task performance (Heller, 46). 
In 1980, D. H. Bordon conducted a study of an army infantry division that was 
designed to assess the effects of stress caused both by job and supervisor.  The combat 
infantry division‘s officers and noncommissioned officers (45 company commanders, 37 
company executive officers, 106 platoon leaders, 42 first sergeants, and 163 platoon 
sergeants) underwent various intellectual tests and questionnaires.  The primary test used 
was the Wonderlic Personnel Test.  This test measures general mental ability for aid in 
personnel selection for particular jobs or positions.  One questionnaire asked personnel to 
rate stress with their seniors and stress created by the job (Heller, 47). 
From this study, it was concluded that stress is a moderating factor in the 
correlation between the leader’s intellectual ability and the performance of their unit. 
There are three explanations for the influence of stress on leadership performance.  First, 
stress may divert a leader’s intellectual effort from the task at hand.  Second, stress may 
affect clarity of communications.  Third, stress may interfere with supervision and control 
of the task.  Thus stress may impair the leader’s ability to plan and implement decision-
making (Heller, 47). 
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This is just an example of how stress impacts superiors, peers, or subordinates and 
the steps in which a leader will process information to make an accurate decision.  The 
decisions and his/her personal actions could determine the performance of the unit and 
the outcome of the battle, just as this model shows some factors to be considered for a 
wartime situation.  This Bayesian Network will show, through historical scenarios, that 
stress plays an important role in the performance of the decision-maker. 
The stress faced by the decision-maker or a professional may be substantial.  For 
many professionals, it is intrinsic to the job itself, where competing demands and 
pressures cannot be escaped.  The sheer volume of work can also be overwhelming at 
times.  Either from his or her own direct experience or from observing colleagues, stress 
can have serious consequences.  Stress can become a living nightmare of running faster 
and faster to stay in the same place, feeling undervalued, feeling unable to say 'no' to any 
demand but not working productively or efficiently on anything.  Signs of stress include 
sleeplessness, aches and pains, and some physical symptoms such as anxiety or nausea 
associated with work.  Unfortunately, some personnel are chronically stressed, becoming 
irritable, and self-absorbed, lacking energy and commitment.  Concentration on even one 
task becomes difficult for these individuals  and they become unreliable in completing 
their job, mission, or task (Fontana, 1989). 
And yet, there are some people that possess the ability to control stress and 
workload levels, handling job frustrations without becoming worn out, irritable, or 
depressed.  These people are able to handle stress, balancing the rough with the smooth, 
keeping a sense of humor and renewing their energy and resources so that the working 
life continues to bring pleasure and reward (Fontana, 1989). 
Performance is another factor that must be looked at carefully.  The 
documentation that addresses the performance of humans on specified systems tasks and 
task sequence constitutes a performance standard.  Human factors performance standards 
usually are concerned with how well an ind ividual or team performs as evaluated against 
system-specific performance specifications.  Human performance standards may include 
time to select an action; time and accuracy in making decisions; accuracy interpreting 
information, problem solving, diagnosis, action selection, team performance, 
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communication and control activities, time to respond, and workloads associated with a 
control sequence (Charlton, 57). 
The primary node related to this is Performance.  Performance is a descendant of 
every other node in this model.  Performance is broken into three states - Poor 
Performance, Average Performance and Good Performance.  The decision-maker 










Figure 3.   The Basis for the Model 
 
One node leading to Performance is Stress.  The soldier/sailor is the backbone of 
the military.  With the demands imposed by a new situation, the stress on a soldier/sailor 
can be significant.  The node Stress, representing the soldier's well-being, has the 
following parent nodes:  personal factors, level of exertion, sleep condition, duration of 
operation, and risk assessment.  The Stress node possesses three states defined as low, 
moderate, and high.  “Low” stress is defined as the lower 25% of the various 
combinations for stress, “moderate” ranges between 26%-74%, and finally, “high” is 
defined with a range greater than 75%.  Of course, this status of well-being is based on an 
individual level. Some people function much better in a stressful environment than in 
relaxed settings. 
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A parent node of the stress node is personal factors, which deals with the soldier's 
individual problems and his/her dealings with those problems.  Leaders recognize that 
most soldiers have a desire to contribute to the team and to be part of the team effort.  
Leaders build on a soldier’s personal motivation by realizing that each soldier has 
different abilities (FM 22-102, 1987).  A good leader develops individual soldier 
strengths into team strengths.  Thus if the soldier has personal problems, caring means 
that the leader strives to assist him/her in dealing with those problems.  When a soldier is 
unable to focus, personal problems add to the stress, which can hinder mission 
accomplishment.  When problems are discussed with peers or leaders, stress can be 
reduced.  Life events that generate stress can be measured using a scale such as the 
Holmes-Rahe Stress Scale.  On the Holmes-Rahe scale, "Low Stress" is a score of 150 
points or less.  This score indicates that the person has a slight risk of illness.  "Normal 
Stress" is with a score of 150-299.  The risk of illness to this person is moderate.  "High 
Stress" is defined as 300+ points.  The person with this level of stress has a greatly 
increased risk of serious illness and efforts to reduce stress level should be undertaken 
immediately (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). 
Stress




Figure 4.   Personal Factors Node. 
 
Level of Exertion possesses the following state spaces: Easy, Moderate, and 
Difficult.  A soldier’s level of exertion can impede the success of the mission.  If soldiers 
are not prepared for tasks, whether physical or mental, then the level of exertion is 
increased.  Usually with the increase in the level of exertion there will be an increase in 
stress.  This varies from person to person (FM 22-102,1987).  Thus, stress will increase 
under the influence of level of exertion.  Fitness level is independent of Stress given 
Level of Exertion.  Fitness Level influences Level of Exertion.  If the soldier/sailor is 
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physically fit, then the level of exertion required to accomplish a task is decreased when 
compared to a soldier or sailor who is not fit (FM 21-20, 1992).  These ratings are based 
on the Borg Scale of Perceived Exertion.  Borg's scale (Borg, 1982) ranges from 0 to 10, 
with 0 as no exertion and 10 as extremely strong exertion (almost maximum). 
 Easy ranges from 0-3. 
 Moderate ranges from 4-6. 
 Difficult ranges from 7-10. 
The next parent of the Stress node is Level of Exertion.  Fitness level is the parent 
of Level of Exertion.  A soldier’s level of physical fitness has a direct impact on his 
combat readiness.  There are many components to physical fitness such as weight control, 
diet, nutrition, stress management, and spiritual and ethical fitness.  Fitness level is just 
one factor that influences how one’s stamina will be affected.  Fitness level focuses on 
three different areas of the body:  cardiovascular training, strength training, and flexibility 
training.  Cardiovascular training requires some type of aerobic activity.  With aerobic 
exercise, the goal is to get your heart rate into the target zone (50-85% of the person's 
maximum) and sustain that pace for a specified period of time.  Second, strength training 
refers to muscular strength and is defined as the maximum force that can be exerted by a 
muscle or muscle group.  Third, flexibility is defined as the range of motion (ROM) 
around a joint.  Within each joint, there is an optimum ROM necessary for peak 
performance.  Factors that affect flexibility include age, inactivity, gender, body type and 
strength training.  The states of fitness level are as follows: 
 -Fitness Level 1 refers to a soldier who never (or rarely) participates in 
aerobic activity, performs resistance-training exercises, or rarely stretches (Balbach, 
2001).  
 -Fitness Level 2 refers to a soldier who participates in aerobic activity for 
at least 20 minutes, 3 times per week, performs at least 1 set of 15-20 repetitions on 8-10 
of the major muscle groups, 2-3 times per week, and occasionally stretches most of the 
major muscle groups (Balbach, 2001). 
27 
 -Fitness Level 3 refers to a soldier who comfortably participates in aerobic 
activity for at least 30 minutes, 3-4 times per week, performs at least 2 sets of 8-12 
repetitions on 8-10 major muscle groups 3-4 times per week, and always stretches the 









Figure 5.   Fitness Level Node. 
 
Stress is a descendant of the node, Sleep Condition.  Humans have a sleep 
reservoir that fluctuates depending on how much sleep a person receives on a daily basis.  
In this model, the node, Sleep Condition, will use the following states: Inadequate, 
Adequate, and Well-Rested.  Inadequate sleep refers to a condition when a person fails to 
get enough sleep over any period of time.  This could include acute or chronic sleep 
deprivation.  Failure to get enough sleep results in a "sleep debt" (Blue, 2000).  If the 
sleep reservoir continues to be depleted, the body will refuse to stay awake, regardless of 
how hard the person tries to fight it (www.salvoblue.homestead.com/sleep).  Adequate 
sleep refers to a condition when a person receives an adequate amount of sleep.  Most 
sleep experts agree that an average of 8 hours of sleep per day is required.  Well-Rested 
refers to a condition when a person has received 8 or more hours of sleep.  Proper sleep 
and rest are necessary to keep soldiers functioning at their best.  The leader needs to 
develop a sleep discipline routine both for the soldiers and for him/herself.  Soldiers 
cannot operate efficiently without proper sleep and the leader needs to rest to make 
appropriate decisions.  Without proper sleep, the leader or soldier/sailor becomes irritable 
and friction develops within the unit.  A sleep-deprived person becomes a detriment to 
the unit.  This can have a negative effect on the cohesiveness and performance of the unit 
(FM 22-102, 1987). 
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The parent to Sleep Condition and grandparent to Stress is Operational Tempo.  
Operational Tempo refers to the pace of the operations and influences the quantity of 
sleep allocated to the soldiers and sailors. A high operational tempo will detract from the 
quality of sleep each person will receive (FM 22-102, 1987).  The three states of 
Operational Tempo are High, Medium, and Low. 
 -Low refers to preparing for war in accordance to the timeline discussed 
with the threat at a minimum.  
 -Medium refers to continuous preparation where the threat of war can 
occur at any time and units prepare in accordance to the timeline.  
 -High refers to a prepared state of readiness for war.  The timeline for 
tasks/mission accomplishment decreases by at least 50% of the time allocation set by 
higher headquarters and the chain of command. 
The parent to Operational Tempo is Threat.  Threat condition or THREATCON is 
defined as a formal level of anti-terrorist readiness, directed by commanders to upgrade 
physical security readiness to deter terrorist attack (COMNAVFORJAPANINST 5530.7, 
1999).  Depending on the immediacy of the threat, operational tempo affects quality and 
quantity of sleep (see Figure 6).  With these factors considered, a soldier’s stress level 
can fluctuate greatly.  Threat has the following phases: 
 -Threatcon A is a condition that applies when there is a general threat of 
possible terrorist activity against installations and personnel, the nature and extent of 
which are unpredictable, but when circumstances do not justify full implementation of 
the measure of Threatcon B. 
 -Threatcon B is when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist 
activity exists.  The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained 
for weeks without causing undue hardship, without affecting operational capability, and 
without aggravating relations with local authorities.   
 -Threatcon C is the condition that applies when an incident occurs or when 
intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations 
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and personnel is imminent.  Implementation of this measure for more than a short period 
will probably create a hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its 
personnel. 
 -Threatcon D is the fourth condition that applies when a terrorist attack 
has occurred or intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific 
location is likely.  Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning 







Figure 6.   Threat Node. 
 
The fourth node out of six that feeds into the Stress Node is the Duration of the 
Operation.  The length of the operation can affect the morale of the soldiers and unit.  
The leader should assist soldiers in dealing with the duration of the engagement and teach 
them about the physical and mental effects of sustained operations.  This in turn will 
reduce Stress (FM 22-102, 1987).  The states should be self-explanatory and vary 
according to the battle.  The states are as follows: 
-Less than 30 hours 
-Less than 60 hours 
-Less than 90 hours 
-Less than 120 hours and  
-Greater than 120 hours. 
These states represent the time limit in which a mission should be completed. The 
time limit that is planned for may not occur.  Increased time for individuals may cause 








Figure 7.   Duration of the Operation Node. 
 
The fifth node that affects the Stress node is Risk Assessment.  This is the most 
complicated node for the entire model.  In itself, Risk Assessment has 7 parent nodes; 
some of which feed into other parent nodes as seen in Figure 8.  For example, Planning is 
the parent to Risk Assessment but simultaneously is feeding into Sustainability and 
Mission Control.  Risk Assessment contains the states of: 
-Overall Low Risk 
-Overall Caution 
-Overall High Risk.  
The Army Risk Assessment Guide defines the states listed above and the parent 
nodes listed below.  The overall states are based on the parent nodes and their states of 
Low Risk, Caution, and High Risk.  The parent nodes are as follows: 
-Mission Control 
-Soldier Endurance 





Their states are Low Risk, Caution, and High Risk.  Low Risk is estimated as less 
than 25% chance of danger from the mission.  Caution is estimated between the ranges of 
26-75% chance of danger.  High Risk is estimated at 76% chance of danger being 
immanent (Risk Assessment Worksheet, 1993). 
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Risk Assessment directly affects Stress.  The Chief of Staff of the Army in 1995 
stated that with the proper assessment, “Risk Management allows us to operate 
successfully in high risk environments.  Leaders at every level have the responsibility to 
identify hazards, to take measures to reduce or eliminate hazards, and then to accept risk 
only to the point that the benefits outweigh the potential costs.”  Prior planning to reduce 













Figure 8.   Risk Assessment Node. 
 
Task Organization, Training Event, and Planning are parents to the Mission 
Control node as shown in Figure 9.  These factors affect the difficulty of the mission and 
determine what the soldiers/sailors may endure.  The task organization for a leader will 
determine if he/she has mission control of the situation.  A leader is used to working with 
a particular group of soldiers.  When the group dynamics change by adding a new 
member to the unit or by removing a subunit to complete another tasking, mission control 
becomes less certain.  In turn, when a leader is determining the requirements needed to 
achieve a successful mission, he/she must consider the availability of his/her own unit. 
They must also consider what is required to support any attached units as well (FM 7-











Figure 9.   Mission Control Node.  
 
Task Organization has the following states:  OPCON, Attached, and Organic.  
The command relationship refers to the relationship between the various units of the 
battalion.  They are defined below (FM 7-20,1992). 
 -OPCON refers to a unit provided to another commander for specific 
missions or tasks (FM 7-20, 1992). 
 -Attached refers to the unit operating temporarily with an organization.  
Logistics for this unit are the responsibility of the supported unit (FM 7-20,1992). 
 -Organic are the personnel and equipment that make up the unit (FM 7-20, 
1992). 
Type Mission has the following states spaces:  Support Nontactical, Day Tactical, 
and Night Tactical.  These three state spaces are the ways in which the military will 
engage in actual operations.  The military trains the way it intends to fight because 
historical references show the direct correlation between realistic training and the success 
on the battlefield (FM 25-100, 1988).  When units train as they fight, the soldiers/sailors 
are familiar with the procedures of that unit, given a particular mission. This permits the 
leader to think and deal with other situations.  Control required for daytime non-tactical 
operations is less than that required for daytime tactical operations.  Night tactical 
operations require the most control due to the increased hazards associated with night 
operations (FM7-20, 1992).  The state spaces are defined below. 
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 -Support Nontactical is when a unit supports the warfighter through 
logistics required to accomplish the mission (FM7-20, 1992). 
 -Day Tactical is movement during the day by the warfighter to obtain 
battle position (FM 7-20, 1992). 
 -Night Tactical is movement during the night by the warfighter to obtain 
battle position (FM 7-20, 1992). 
The Planning node, with state spaces of low risk, caution, and high risk, considers 
many aspects of the Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP). If improper mission 
analysis is done and time is not properly allocated then there is a high probability that the 
commander will have to do more supervision during the execution of the plan.  In 
combat, the situation changes rapidly, communication is broken, units are disrupted, and 
the commander's personal presence is limited both in time and space.  When planning for 
an operation, leaders must consider these factors. 
Guidance takes into account the fact that subordinates must be able to do what 
their commanders want them to do.  Mission-type orders and the commander's intent 
provide soldiers and leaders with guidance so that they can exercise individual initiative.  
The guidance from superiors will determine what the leader/commander is allowed to do 
to complete the mission (FM7-20, 1992).  From there, the mission analysis is conducted 
and the leader determines what personnel, equipment and supplies will be required to 
sustain and accomplish that mission. 
Preparatory Time considers how much time a commander allocates to his 
subordinates to accomplish the mission.  If the commander does not allocate time 
according to the “1/3 – 2/3 Rule” (which means that for planning purposes, HQ can take 
only 1/3 of the allocated time with the remaining two-thirds left for each subordinate HQ)  
then many problems can occur.  One of the problems is that soldiers must skip steps or 
move more rapidly in order to accomplish the mission under the compressed timeline.  
This increases the amount of supervision required to mitigate risk and ensure that tasks 
get accomplished.  Also, if there is very little preparatory time to begin with, the level of 
detail in the planning stage of the operation will be diminished.  Thus Preparatory Time 
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and Guidance influence Planning.  With proper planning, sustaining the fighting force 









Figure 10.   Planning Node 
 
The state spaces for the node, Preparatory Time, are listed below. 
 -Minimal gives the soldiers less than 33% of the time to get ready for the 
mission. 
 -Adequate gives 50% of the time allocated for soldiers to prepare for 
deployment. 
-Optimum is maximizing the time for planning and allowing the individual 
soldiers to accomplish the mission and task by allowing two-thirds for 
preparation. 
Guidance is the other parent node to Planning (FM 7-20, 1992).  Guidance is the 
guidelines that are given by higher headquarters and followed for the unit to accomplish 
their mission.  The leader uses this guidance to plan for the mission. 
The three states for these nodes are: 
 -FRAGO is a fragment of the operation order (OPORDER).  Details of the 
mission are not available just as time is probably not either.  
 -OPORD is a full plan given by higher headquarters and what the unit's 
procedure is to accomplish the higher headquarter's mission.  
 -OPLAN/LOI is the operations plan for the theater of operations. 
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Another link to the Risk Assessment node is the Soldier Endurance.  Soldier 
Endurance, with states spaces of low risk, caution, and high risk, is a measure of how 
much a soldier/sailor can tolerate before his/her body physically becomes exhausted.  
This node has two parents that are Environment Preparation and Soldier Preparation as 
shown in Figure 11. 
Environment Preparation will take into account whether or not the soldier's 
physical aspect can meet the challenges of the mission in a particular environment.  The 
body requires time to adapt to various temperature changes and conditions.  For instance, 
a person who is moving from Alaska to Panama will require a period in which to adapt to 
the drastic temperature changes.  In another example, when air pressure changes from sea 
level to high altitude such as moving from Ft. Polk, Louisiana to Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, breathing is a difficulty.  Environment Preparation influences Soldier 
Endurance.  If a soldier is not acclimated to his/her environment then he is likely to feel 
the effects of fatigue more rapidly than someone who is adjusted to their environment.  
The states are as follows: 
 -Nonacclimated.  This is the state in which the soldier has not adapted to 
the environmental conditions. 
 -Partially acclimated.  This is the state in which the soldier has been with 
the gaining unit for a brief time (50% of the unit's requirement to adapt to the 
environment) but is not yet fully acclimated to the environment. 
 -Acclimated.  This is the state in which the soldier’s body has adapted to 
the environment. 
Soldier Preparation is the amount of time that a soldier requires to get ready for a 
mission.  The military personnel may need time to prepare his/her personal effects as well 
as gather equipment for deployment or mission.  The state of mind of a soldier knowing 
that he/she is situated with their personal affairs and is confident with their abilities as a 
soldier will determine how much a soldier can endure (FM 22-102, 1987).  The states are 











Figure 11.   Soldier Endurance Node 
 
The next node is Soldier Selection.  There are two parent nodes.  They are Task 
and Soldier Experience. 
A Task is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals 
and units (FM 7-20, 1992).  It is a specific activity that contributes to the accomplishment  
of a mission.  The commander must conduct a task analysis, which identifies and 
understands all tasks required for success.  This includes those required to ensure unity of 
effort with adjacent units.  This includes specified and implied tasks.  After the leader 
does his/her analysis, the leader will assign the specific tasks to those selected soldiers 
that are capable of completing the task or mission.  Leaders must attempt to match a 
soldier's experience with the task in order to capitalize on it.  The Task node utilizes the 
following three states. 
 -Simple tasks are tasks that anyone can complete with general knowledge. 
 -Routine tasks are the basic tasks that are within their branch that are 
commonly known to everyone within the unit or field. 
 -Complex tasks requires more time than is allocated to accomplish the task 
or mission. 
Soldier Experience offers the senior leadership qualities that can be exploited in 
accomplishing the mission.  The soldiers are trained by taking tasks explained in their 
field manuals and actually accomplishing the task to the given standard and set time.  
Within the guidance of the regulations, the soldiers will be qualified within their military 
specialty.  Actual engagements such as war may qualify soldiers because the book does 
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not encompass everything that a soldier may experience in a battle situation.  These are 
the state spaces for soldier experience. 
 -Untrained.  The soldier is not able to do a 90% of the tasks assigned to 
that military field per SOP. 
 -MOS qualified.  The soldiers are fully qualified in all of the tasks that are 
required for their own specialty. 
 -Highly qualified.  Soldier is able to adapt to the changing situation 
without higher guidance or without the aid of manuals.  Individuals are able to apply 









Figure 12.   Soldier Selection Node 
 
The next node is Weather, which has the states spaces of low risk, caution, and 
high risk.  Weather is an important factor such that it governs how the unit will 
accomplish the mission.  Weather influences the Terrain node by assisting or impeding 
the friendly or enemy forces.  For example, hard compacted dirt roads are great for 
soldiers to travel on but when rain pounds the dirt into mud, vehicles have a tendency to 
move slowly and/or get stuck.  When vehicles are traveling in a convoy or solo, they are 
more vulnerable to attacks with unsuitable driving conditions.  Visibility/Moisture and 
Temperature influence Weather.  These two factors will influence how the leader will 
analyze and approach the area of operations with respect to friendly and enemy 
capabilities.  The two primary parent nodes are Temperature and Visibility/Moisture.  
The Temperature states are self-explanatory.  They are as follows:   
 -Less than 31 degrees and greater than 80 degrees Fahrenheit 
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 -Range between 32-59 degrees Fahrenheit and 
 -Range between 60-79 degrees Fahrenheit. 
The Visibility/Moisture states are self-explanatory.  This node has the following 
states: 
 -Clear/Dry. 
 -Foggy with humidity. 








Figure 13.   Weather Node. 
 
Another piece of the puzzle that is required for determining Risk Assessment is 
Terrain.  There are three parents for Terrain.  They are Weather, Trafficability, and Type 
Terrain.  Weather will either impede or assist the unit depending whether they are in an 
offensive or defensive position. 
Trafficability allows the decision-makers to become aware of movement 
conditions for soldiers and equipment and how it will assist or hinder in the navigation of 
the terrain.  Traveling on cross-country trails can be a higher risk than traveling along 
improved roads because of possible enemy attack.  Yet, with improved roads, greater 
quantities of vehicles and people are able to move faster and with a smaller chance of 
being attacked.  Then there is the combination of the two, quantity and quality.  For 
example, there are improved roads that meander along the side of a mountain.  No matter 
how fast a leader wants to arrive at a particular place and time, Trafficability is governed 
by Terrain.  The levels are: 
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 -Improved.  The roads are paved and accessible through smaller roads. 
 -Secondary roads.  The roads are able to carry vehicles and soldiers but are 
usually smaller in width (one way at a time) and are made of compressed dirt or clay. 
 -Trail Cross-Country.  Roads allow passage through a highly dense 
vegetation area but the trail is not suitable to movement of people or equipment because 
of possible attack. 
Type Terrain has three states that are defined below (FM 7-20, 1992).  Terrain 
type will determine if the land or sea is navigatable.  They are regarded as natural or man-
made obstructions that canalize, delay, restrict, or divert movements of a force. 
 -Go.  Terrain that is judged Go is fairly open and presents no hindrance to 
maneuver.  Nothing need be done to enhance mobility.  Terrain that would hinder one 
type of unit may not hinder another type of unit (FM 7-20, 1992). 
 -Slow-Go.  Terrain is judged SLOW-GO if the slopes or vegetation it 
contains can slow or disrupt maneuver of the force being considered to move through it.  
SLOW-GO terrain hinders maneuver less than NO-GO terrain.  Other assets are also 
needed to enhance mobility.  Terrain that is SLOW-GO to a mechanized force might be 
GO to a dismounted force (FM 7-20, 1992). 
 -No-Go.  Terrain is judged NO-GO if movement through it by a particular 
type of force seems impractical unless much effort is made to enhance mobility.  The 
road network in an area might still support mounted movement, even if the terrain itself 








Figure 14.   Terrain Node. 
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The last parent node to Risk Assessment is Sustainability, with state spaces of low 
risk, caution, and high risk.  Sustainability is the ability to sustain a unit for a period of 
time to accomplish their mission.  This node is influenced by Logistics because combat 
cannot be sustained for long periods of time without proper resupply of personnel and 
equipment.  If personnel and equipment are not sustained, the assets for engaging the 
opposing side will be depleted. The parents are Type System and Percentage Personnel 
Fill. 
In the node, Type System, the system offers protection to the soldiers in those 
vehicles and mobility to the destination point.  The types of system are wheeled, track or 
crew served.  Type System will determine what degree of support is required.  If 
numerous vehicles are taken, the leader needs to calculate what quantities of fuel, 
maintenance, and drivers are needed in order to sustain the mission.  Type System 
influences sustainability because supply requirements for track vehicles are greater than 
other supply vehicles - such as wheeled vehicles.  The increase in supply requirements 
creates a heavier load on the system, thus putting it at risk.  These states refer to vehicle 
types. 
Percentage Personnel Fill.  The states are Range 0-65%, Range 66-79%, and 
Range 80-100%.  This is self-explanatory and indicates the personnel status.  This affects 







Figure 15.   Sustainability Node. 
 
Logistics is vital in sustainability.  Without preparing for the battlefield, soldiers 
and equipment will take a great loss.  The states of the Logistics node are Low Risk, 
Caution, and High Risk.  Low Risk is defined in this and other nodes as having less than 
25% loss to equipment and personnel.  Caution is defined with the possible loss of 26% 
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to 75% of the unit equipment and personnel.  Lastly, High Risk is probable loss of 76% 
or more of unit equipment and personnel.  Resource constraints will always affect how 
support operations are conducted.  The development of programs and sustainment 
systems ensure continuous support and are critical functions of sustainment planning and 
execution.  As shown in the diagram below, Fuel, Maintenance, Ammunition, and Food 
and Water influence Logistics.  There are a selected few classes of supply that are vital to 








Figure 16.   Logistics Node. 
 
The parents of the Logistics node, with states spaces of low risk, caution, and high 
risk, are fuel, maintenance, ammunition, and food and water.  Each of these nodes is 
separated into four states.  The states are green, yellow, red and black.  Green is defined 
with having less than 25% loss, yellow is defined with a probable loss between 26% and 
74%, red is having the loss rate of 90% or less while black ranges between 91%-100%. 
Logistics is an asset for survival on the battlefield.  Sustainment is vital to the 
success of the operational and tactical levels of war.  The ability to provide and sustain 
support for combat operations is predicated on thorough, integrated planning.  This 
causes an inseparable relationship between operations, tactics, and sustainment whether 
you are on the land, at sea or in the air (FM 100-10, 1998). 
-Fuel is an asset necessary to move vehicles, ships, and aircraft.  It also helps 
support units in running generators, medical equipment, and heaters.  These are pertinent 
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in making sure that forward units are able to continue sustained movement towards the 
objective.  A fighting force can move and fight only as long as it is supplied with fuel.  
The modern high-performance aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles provide great potential 
mobility, but consume vast amounts of fuel.  This remains one of the many important  
factors a leader must consider (FM 100-10, 1998). 
-Maintenance assists the units in fixing and maintaining their vehicles for battle.  
Maintenance also pertains to support equipment such as forklifts and generators.  
Maintenance operations must be planned to support the momentum of the battle and 
massing at critical points.  Repairing at the point of malfunction or damage is a priority.  
The momentum is enhanced when the maximum number of weapon systems can be kept 
operable and mobile.  Mechanics must be able to perform their mission in the forward 
areas (FM 100-10, 1998). 
-Ammunition is a vital asset in destroying the enemy.  Regardless of the position, 
soldiers require ammunition to fight the opposition.  Today's fighting force uses a large 
variety of sophisticated weapon systems, which consume large quantities of ammunition.  
The arming system must deliver the right mix and quantities of ammunition to the right 
place and at the right time.  Weapon systems must be armed to the point of employment 
as the tactical situation permits (FM 100-10,1998). 
-Lastly, food and water support the individual.  Without food and water, the body 
will grow weak and collapse.  This can also affect the mind, resulting in poor decision-
making (FM 100-10, 1998).  The human body can survive 3 days without water and 
respectively, 3 weeks without food.  Food and water are among the most important 
factors in soldier health, morale, and welfare (FM 100-10, 1998). 
The last node is Leadership Effectiveness.  This node is parent to Performance.  
There are three parents that feed into Leadership Effectiveness.  Each node possesses 
three states of Good, Average, and Bad.  These levels are not defined because it is an 
individual opinion and judgment.  That opinion will determine the Leader's confidence to 
lead the unit into the engagement.  The parents are as follows: 
 -Relationship with Superiors 
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 -Relationship with Peers and 












Figure 17.   Leadership Effectiveness Node. 
 
In the Scenario of Task Force Smith and the Battle of Kursk, the nodes remain the 
same for both.  In the Battle of Midway, three nodes are changed.  They are as follows: 
 - Threat in Vicinity of Operation, 
 - Sea State,  
 - Platform. 
The node name for Trafficability changes to Threat in Vicinity of Operations.  The 
state spaces change accordingly to the respective names designated by the United States 
Navy.  Since the US Navy does not use roads and travels via sea- lanes, the states are 
defined in accordance to the presence of the enemy’s threat.  The states are as follows: 
 -Immediate.  Travel on the sea- lanes is near impossible.  The threat of the 
enemy is imminent and they are preparing to engage in battle.  The sighting of another 
ship is far and few. 
 -Near.  The enemy is nearby but is not yet ready to engage in battle. 
 -Distant.  The sea- lanes are open and mobility and agility to travel is easy.  
The sighting of another ship is rare.  Enemy threat is at a minimum.  The leader has time 
to prepare for engagement. 
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The second node to change is that Type Terrain becomes Sea State.  Weather 
influences the sea states.  If weather is becoming violent, then the sea states are increased 
drastically, which impedes operations and movement on the sea- lanes.  There are 12 
states to this node and they are defined according to the United States Coast Guard.  Sea 
state is defined by the value of the sea surface displaced at any random time.  The 
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A commonly used description of sea states is listed below.  See Appendix D for 
pictorial representation. 
 -Sea State 0 - Wind speed is less than 1 knot and sea is like a mirror. 
 -Sea State 1 - Wind speed is 1-3 knots, wave height is .1 m, ripples with 
appearance of scales, and no foam crests.  
 -Sea State 2 - Wind speed is 4-6 knots, wave height is .2-.3 m, and small 
wavelets with crest of glassy appearance not breaking.  
 -Sea State 3 - Wind speed is 7-10 knots, wave height is .6-1 m, and large 
wavelets with crests beginning to break and scattered whitecaps. 
 -Sea State 4 - Wind speed is 11-16 knots, wave height is 1-1.5m, and 
small waves become longer with numerous whitecaps. 
 -Sea State 5 - Wind speed is 17-21 knots, wave height is 2-2.5m, and 
moderate waves taking longer form, many whitecaps and some spraying. 
 -Sea State 6 - Wind speed is 22-27 knots, wave height is 3-4m, and larger 
waves forming with whitecaps everywhere and more spraying. 
 -Sea State 7 - Wind speed is 28-33 knots, wave height is 4-5.5m, the sea 
heaps up, and white foam from the breaking waves begins to be blown in streaks along 
the direction of the wind. 
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 -Sea State 8 - Wind speed is 34-40 knots, wave height is 5.5-7.5m, the 
moderately high waves of greater length with the edges of crest begin to break into 
spindrift and foam is blown in well-marked streaks. 
 -Sea State 9 - Wind speed is 41-47 knots, wave height is 7-10m, the high 
waves, sea begins to roll, dense streaks of foam along wind direction, and spray may 
reduce visibility. 
 -Sea State 10 - Wind speed is 48-55 knots, wave height is 9-12.5m, very 
high waves with overhanging crests, sea takes white appearance as foam is blown in very 
dense streaks, rolling is heavy and shocklike, and visibility is reduced. 
 -Sea State 11 - Wind speed is 56-63 knots, wave height is 11.5-16m, 
exceptionally high waves, sea covered in white foam patches, and visibility still more 
reduced.  The sea states are defined by the US Coast Guard and are from the website: 
http://www.irbs.com/bowditch/pdf/chapt37.pdf. 
The third node to change is Type System to Platform.  Platform is the type system 
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Figure 18.   Sea-Lanes Node. 
 
These nodes represent several factors that would affect the decision-maker and 
the possible performance of the unit under a particular situation.  These components 
would assist the leader during any particular event regardless in training or war.  There 
are numerous factors to be included.  This model just represents a portion of them. 
 
C. THE SCENARIOS 
The scenarios are taken from historical accounts.  The information prior to the 
battle is instantiated within the model and then the probabilistic outcome is updated as the 
battle is completed.  When completed, the model is compared to the final outcome of the 
battle to see if the same conclusion is drawn. 
There are three scenarios being used: 
 1.  US Army - Task Force Smith during the Korean War, 
 2.  US Navy - Battle of Midway during World War II, 
 3.  German Army - The Battle of Kursk. 
Task Force Smith was a crucial 7-hour battle that would change that pattern of the 
whole Korean conflict and maybe the course of history.  Within the history books, it is 
stated that only one out of seven men serving in Task Force Smith were combat veterans.  
Those that had enlisted prior to the Korean War were there to escape the boredom in 
small town America.  The 43% of the lower ranking enlisted soldiers scored in the two 
lowest categories of the Army's qualification tests, which denies enlistment to most 
candidates today.  The soldiers were devoted to LTC Brad Smith and their peers.  They 
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were willing to stand and fight so that the majority of the soldiers could return to base 
camp when the order of retreat was given.  LTC Smith earned the respect of his seniors 
when Gen Collins stated, "Now matured and with combat experience back of him, he was 
well qualified to lead the first American army troops to fight in the Korean War."  This 
gives you a basic idea of the relationship between superiors, subordinates and peers, the 
stress that would be placed on this unit, and the performance that would result.  See 
Appendix E for a detailed account of the battle. 
In the Battle of Midway, it must have been fate when Admiral Spruance replaces 
Admiral Halsey due to an illness.  Spruance's intelligence, adaptability, and flexibility 
were just the right mixture to counter the methodology of the Japanese.  The sailors were 
devoted to their ship and to each other.  They were working around the clock to fix the 
damaged Yorktown.  With their steadfast work, the Yorktown was ready to sail with Rear 
Admiral Fletcher's Task Force.  The main stress was time pressure to complete the 
repairs.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the US Navy was preparing for a counter-attack 
against the Japanese.  The limited time available to make repairs and counter attack the 
enemy was stressful for everyone.  But, the Americans had surprise and luck on their 
side.  On June 4th, they discovered the Japanese fleet northeast of Midway.  An air battle 
quickly developed.  The turning point came at mid-morning.  The Japanese fighters were 
drawn down to sea level by attacking America torpedo bombers, all of which were lost.  
Their sacrifice cleared the skies above for American dive-bombers.  Within minutes three 
Japanese carriers were ablaze.  By the afternoon, the Japanese fleet retreated.  The one-
day battle reversed the tide of war in the Pacific by placing the Japanese on the defensive.  
See Appendix F for a detailed account of the battle. 
Lastly, in the Battle of Kursk, Adolf Hitler instilled his leadership style and 
attitude through the soldiers and people of his nation.  He has stated in a letter to Herr 
Gemlich on 16 September 1919, "The Republic in Germany owes its birth not to the 
uniform national will of our people but the sly exploitation of a series of circumstances 
which found general expression in a deep, universal dissatisfaction. These circumstances 
however were independent of the form of the state and are still operative today. Indeed, 
more so now than before. Thus, a great portion of our people recognizes that a changed 
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state- form cannot in itself change our situation. For that it will take a rebirth of the moral 
and spiritual powers of the nation. And this rebirth cannot be initiated by a state 
leadership of irresponsible majorities, influenced by certain party dogmas, an 
irresponsible press, or internationalist phrases and slogans. [It requires] instead the 
ruthless installation of nationally minded leadership personalities with an inner sense of 
responsibility."  Initially, the German soldiers believed in Adolf Hitler.  As time 
progressed, Hitler's leadership style controlled people out of fear because of the 
repercussions that he would inflict to his supporters and own soldiers/officers for any 
opposition to the Fuhrer.  Once he was in power, nothing could stop him.  The people of 
Germany realized that it was too late.  If given the chance, the officers would flee 
Germany and join forces with the French Foreign Legion.  Hitler’s leadership style was 
harsh.  This stressed and victimized the leaders' ability to think for themselves and 
obstructed their performance to successfully complete the mission.  See Appendix G for a 
detailed account of the battle. 
 
D. THE DATA 
The research was based mainly on secondary data.  Secondary data were used to 
test the hypothesis. 
 
1. Primary Data 
Primary data are collected data during the experiment or model.  In the 
development of this Bayesian network, no data were collected.  Data should be collected 
to expand upon this work presented in this thesis. 
 
2. Secondary Data 
Secondary data are data obtained from previous experiments, historical 
documents, questionnaires, and government publications.  The research data consists of 
technical reports from US Army doctrine and Joint Publications.  Knowledge of the 
mission capabilities allowed for probabilities to be objective throughout the model.  A 
basic model was created.  After the basic model was built, each model was configured to 
49 
factors common to each branch of service and for each scenario.  Afterward, each generic 
model for each scenario split into two more models with a situation for before and after 
the battle.  Then a comparison of the data was made between the before and after to 
verify the accuracy of the model with the actual outcome of the battle. 
The data consisted of literature that were based on public forums, various 
electronic surveys, previously conducted experiments, and historical scenarios.  
Accountability of the occurrences with each scenario was gathered from historical 
records.  The states spaces for the nodes of the models were determined by this data. 
 
3. The Criteria Governing the Admissibility of the Data 
Personnel, both military and civilian, possessed competent knowledge of 
Bayesian Networks and Human Factors.  All the primary data were obtained through 
Joint Publications.  These publications set the standards that determine if a unit is 
deployable which assist leaders in deciding what unit will move forward into battle. 
Secondary data were obtained form the previously conducted experiments, 
historical facts, electronic websites, and NETICA itself. 
Here is an example of the states spaces used in the generic model prior to 
instantiating.  Through doctrine and models, the numbers with each state space represent 
the probability of occurrence of that particular state space.  With respect to the node, 
Relationship With Superiors, the chance of having a good relationship is 20%, an average 
relationship is 50%, and a bad relationship is 30%.  Each of these three nodes feed into 
Leadership Effectiveness.  The result is that overall majority of the units have great 






















Figure 19.   State Space Example. 
 
The primary research method is quantitative and is supported by US Army 
regulations and Joint Publications. 
The commercial software used for this thesis is Netica, which can interact with 
SIMKIT or other software programs using the API programmer's version.  The model 
allows the decision-maker to consider various possibilities to evaluate the best probable 
outcome of different approaches to military situations incorporating personal behavior 
and other individual patterns.  It is desired that this research will give insight into the 
complex behaviors of humans and their resulting performance under battle conditions, 
their self, and the commander's orders.  In the initial phase of designing the Bayesian 
network, the process is similar to brainstorming in which the designer writes down the 
factors such as environment, risk, or physical fitness (as in this model) that would affect 
the main node.  Afterwards, the decision-maker will decide what factors/nodes feed into 
what particular node via the directional arcs.  Probabilities are propagated through the 
network.  Thus, the probability of an event occurring on a node of interest is updated.  
This model makes it possible to decide which is the best tactical approach with the 
varying human factors.  LT Amy Barsnick is completing congruent work dealing with 
personality traits.  This model feeds into LT Barsnick model through the Stress and Risk 
Assessment node.  Leaders can perform probabilistic inference based on data that they 
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IV. RESULTS 
In the three scenarios, Task Force Smith, The Battle of Midway, and The Battle of 
Kursk, the model presented in this thesis supported the outcome of each battle as 
described historically.  The outcome for each scenario is based on the four primary nodes, 
Performance, Stress, Leadership Effectiveness, and Risk Assessment.  Throughout these 
three scenarios, Performance remained consistent with an outcome of "Good 
Performance".  The following sections address each scenario independently. 
 
A. TASK FORCE SMITH 
Leadership Effectiveness remains strong prior to and during the battle, with a 
status of "Great Leadership" (see Figure 20).  General Dean admitted that the thought of 
failure never crossed his mind.  The command had overconfidence bordering on 
arrogance, the prevailing mood for the Far East Command.  The mood was prevalent 
amongst all ranks from General MacArthur down to the most junior soldiers from LTC 
Smith’s unit.  Superiors believed in LTC Smith.  General Collins stated, “Now matured 
and with combat experience back of him, he was well qualified to lead the first American 
army troops to fight in the Korean War.”  The soldiers were supportive of each other as 
well as of their leaders.  This demonstrated that leadership was strong throughout the unit 











Figure 20.   Leadership Effectiveness - Before and After the Battle 
 
Risk Assessment initially was believed to be a low risk, yet, by the end of the 
battle, with the depletion of supplies, destroyed vehicles, high casualty rate, and poor 
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weather, risk went to a high state.  Now the confidence of the Far East Command would 
become a weakness as concerns emerge about the success of the mission as shown below 














35.0     
 
Figure 21.   Risk Assessment - Before and After the Battle 
 
Stress was at a heightened state, rated as “high” from the beginning to the end of 
the scenario.  In anticipation of engagement, the stress level escalated.  Morale and 
courage were very high for the soldiers going into the battle.  However, the sheer number 
of North Korean attackers overwhelmed the overly confident soldiers.  Since soldiers 
expected the battle to last less than 24 hours, soldiers initially had high morale.  When the 
North Koreans decided to stand and fight, the comradery kept the men together but 




















Figure 22.   Stress - Before and After the Battle  
 
B. BATTLE OF MIDWAY 
The leadership effectiveness remains consistent throughout the battle.  As 
Spruance replaces Halsey after an illness, sailors continued their mission with high 
motivation.  Besides having the respect of his seniors and peers, it was the intelligence, 
adaptability, and flexibility of Spruance that lead to the successful victory of Midway.  
Leadership kept the sailors focused in completing the mission.  Sailors were working 
diligently for hours on end to fix the Yorktown to prepare it to sail with Rear Admiral 
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Fletcher’s Task Force.  This was just a sample of the discipline the soldiers demonstrated 
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Figure 23.   Leadership Effectiveness - Before and After the Battle 
 
Risk Assessment was difficult to begin with but by the end of the battle it had 
more than doubled as shown below in Figure 24.  Weather was the node that remained 
consistent throughout the duration of the battle, which helped to maintain steady sea 
states.  Unfortunately, the sailors were tired from repairing ships and preparing for 
















Figure 24.   Risk Assessment - Before and After the Battle 
 
Besides the stress due to severe time constraints, sailors were physically drained.  
The Stress nearly doubled from the beginning to the end of the battle.  With very little 
sleep and reaching physical exhaustion, sailors could no t properly perform their tasks.  






















Figure 25.   Stress - Before and After the Battle 
 
C. THE BATTLE OF KURSK 
Initially, the German leadership followed orders as a duty to their country.  But as 
time progressed, there was a decrease in support for the Third Reich.  Leaders were afraid 
to do anything without the permission of higher headquarters.  As a result, leadership 




















Figure 26.   Leadership Effectiveness - Before and After Battle 
 
The leadership style placed the greatest amount of stress on the soldiers.  Even 
though stress was "High" before and after the engagement, there was no security that 
support and supplies would assist them in waging war aga inst Russia.  From the 
beginning, shortages of Fuel and lack of Maintenance added to the stress level.  The 




















Figure 27.   Stress - Before and After the Battle 
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In the end, Risk Assessment played a big part.  The German forces started at a 
disadvantage with lack of initial supplies, no possible resupply, terrible weather, and 

















Figure 28.   Risk Assessment - Before and After the Battle 
 
The model output is consistent with the outcome of each battle, justifying the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on this work, the following conclusions may be drawn. 
1.  Bayesian networks can provide a graphical representation of the domain that 
can be implemented in current combat models.  The graphical representation offers 
leaders of various levels of experience a visual display of the factors affecting stress and 
risk assessment.  In visualizing the model, leaders can gain a different perspective on the 
situation. 
2.  Bayesian networks can represent some of the variables that affect Risk 
Assessment and Stress. 
3.  Based on these variables, a probabilistic measure of the degrees of Stress and 
Risk Assessment can be given.  The present model allows the experimenter to assess the 
probabilistic outcome accurately based on the previous research from specialists in the 
fields of stress and risk assessment.  The gathered information from specialists and 
researchers is collected and implemented in the model.  As the state space for each 
variable is instantiated, the probabilistic outcome on the nodes of interest are updated. 
4.  These probabilities can be used to provide input into other models (see 
concurrent thesis by LT Amy Barsnick).  The level of detail in the model associated with 
the nodes is sufficient for use in the probabilistic representation of those variables in any 
other combat model. 
5.  Based on the historical accounts of the three battles, the results are consistent.  
The expected outcome for Performance, Stress, and Risk Assessment in the model 
matched the historical data for the scenarios of Task Force Smith, the Battle of Midway, 
and the Battle of Kursk. 
6.  These models can represent joint, combined, and enemy forces.  Through the 
three scenarios mentioned above, the model can be used for all the branches of service 
and together in joint models.  Also, this model can follow the enemy's possible decision-
making strategy.  An application would be to have two identical models, one for friendly 
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forces and one for enemy forces.  The leaders can use the model to plan accordingly to 
accomplish their mission.  Then the two leaders can begin wargamming to see who 
would win based on tacit knowledge and doctrinal knowledge of their opposition. 
7.  These models can be used as training aids for situational awareness, risk 
assessment, and force protection.  Novice leaders can be taught to be aware of these 
factors in their decision-making. 
8.  The model is based on expert opinion.  Hence, the model is only as good as the 
expert's knowledge of the domain and their ability to express that tacit knowledge.  The 
expert reads field manuals and doctrine and incorporates that with one's experience to 
design the model.  An expert may not have practical experience in dealing with some 
factors.  This causes a little problem in that the expert has no way of knowing what to 
expect.  Thus, it is an advantage to the experimenter to seek guidance and knowledge 
from those people who have practical experience in those fields. 
Lastly, this model displays what a leader should consider when training and, more 
importantly, in battle.  Even though this model considers numerous factors, there are 
more variables that influence the performance of a unit.  It is the leader's responsibility to 
incorporate those ideas or factors into training or for a deployment.  Using a Bayesian 
network provides a “check and balance” for the leader.  The model is a graphical display 














This Bayesian model covers several factors that revolve around the performance 
of a leader.  There are three recommendations that I have regarding this model.  The first 
is to focus on the expansion of the nodes, Leadership Effectiveness and Performance.  
The second recommendation is to consider adding additional nodes.  An example would 
be Type Mission.  The third is to actual collect data and determine how they influence the 
present model. 
The nodes of Leadership Effectiveness and Performance are influenced by 
numerous factors.  For instance, Leadership Effectiveness could be impacted by culture, 
age, experience, and education to name a few.  Then Performance can be predicted by 
variables such as gender, position, location of solider, location of unit, and relationship 
between leaders.  Of course, there are more variables to consider.  Prediction of 
Leadership Effectiveness and Performance would require their own model.  These two 
nodes were not expanded on because each could be a thesis in itself. 
For Type Mission, the state spaces could involve “attack, defend, breaching 
movements, movement to contact, ambush, and MOUT”.  The state space for this 
variable would change depending on the size and type of force.  There are other nodes 
that would influence the Type Mission such as assault force, breach force, attacker or 
defender (FM 7-20, 1992).  The node Type Mission could be an element of a larger 
Bayesian network.  However, this expansion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Lastly, real data would be the most beneficial aspect to this model.  Data should 
be collected in a location where soldiers train under similar conditions as that of the 
environment you are trying to model.  For instance, the observer should prepare a survey 
prior to the exercise that asks how the soldier is feeling, what his/her stress level is, and 
the relationship to his/her peers, subordinates, and superiors.  The observer should go to 
the field to observe a squad go through particular drills such as MOUT, reacting to a 
sniper, or reacting to an ambush.  Then the observer needs to monitor the time, write 
various operations, and interactions between unit members throughout the duration of the 
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exercise.  Finally, the observer should repeat the same survey to see if there is a 
difference at the end of the exercise.  If possible, the observer could have the soldiers 
wear actigraphs so that the sleep could be monitored.  This will allow an actual 
measurement of sleep and rest for the soldier in comparison to what he/she states how 
they think they slept.  The reason for one location is to control the possible climate 
changes of the region.  The use of a field exercise would provide many of the similarities 
that soldiers might face in an actual battle.  This would be a more accurate assessment of 
the model and data will not be tainted with unnecessary variables. 
The US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences has 
developed sample questionnaires for the company commander and the platoon leader.  
These questionnaires gather information from successful leaders about how they lead and 
use this information to recommend ways to develop effective leaders (ARI, 1999).  A 
good questionnaire or survey could provide detailed information vital to a model if the 
questions are posed correctly. 
Elicitation of expert knowledge can be accomplished using a few different 
methods such as questionnaires, surveys, or models.  Elicitation of expert knowledge is 
obtained in the following ways:  1) if modeler acquired expertise through personal 
experience, 2) if modeler is intimately related to the situation, 3) if modeler receives 
formal training or education in doctrine, 4) modeler observes leaders in action, and 5) 
modeler surveys experts on domain of interest  (Ft Leavenworth Research Unit, 1999).  
These are just a few factors that need to be considered in making this model a practical 
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APPENDIX B 
HOLMES-RAHE SOCIAL READJUSTMENT RATINGS SCALE 
SCALE FOR ADULTS (18 AND OVER) 
Life Event................................................... Life Change Units 
Death of a Spouse....................... 100 
Divorce.................................. 73 
Marital Separation....................... 65 
Imprisonment............................. 63 
Death of a Close Family Member........... 63 
Personal Injury or Illness............... 53 
Marriage................................. 50 
Dismissal from Work...................... 47 
Marital Reconciliation................... 45 
Retirement............................... 45 
Change in Health of Family Member........ 44 
Pregnancy................................ 40 
Sexual Difficulties...................... 39 
Gain a New Family Member................. 39 
Business Readjustment.................... 39 
Change in Financial State................ 38 
Change in Frequency of Arguments......... 35 
Major Mortgage........................... 32 
Foreclosure of Mortgage or Loan.......... 30 
Change in Responsibilities at Work....... 29 
Child Leaving Home....................... 29 
Trouble with In-Laws..................... 29 
Outstanding Personal Achievement......... 28 
Spouse Starts or Stop Work............... 26 
Begin or End School...................... 26 
Change in Living Conditions.............. 25 
Revision of Personal Habits.............. 24 
Trouble with Boss........................ 23 
Change in Working Hours or Conditions.... 20 
Change in Residence...................... 20 
Change in Schools........................ 20 
Change in Recreation..................... 19 
Change in Church Activities.............. 19 
Change in Social Activities.............. 18 
Minor Mortgage or Loan................... 17 
Change in Sleeping Habits................ 16 
Change in Number of Family Reunions...... 15 
Change in Eating Habits.................. 15 
Vacation................................. 13 
Christmas................................ 12 
Minor Violation of Law................... 11 
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Score 300+: Be extremely careful 
------ you are at a greatly increased risk of serious illness (reduce stress now!). 
Score 150-299+: Be cautious  
------ your risk of illness is moderate (reduced by 30% from the above risk). 
Score 150-: Be glad 
------- you only have a slight risk of illness (but still need to take care of yourself!). 
NOTE: Since individual responses vary so greatly, your score is only a crude 
measure of your level of stress... but you will see better WHY you are stressed. 
SCALE FOR CHILDREN (18 AND UNDER)  
Life Event................................................... Life Change Units 
Getting married......................... 101 
Unwed pregnancy.......................... 92 
Death of parent.......................... 87 
Acquiring a visible deformity............ 81 
Divorce of parents....................... 77 
Fathering an unwed pregnancy............. 77 
Becoming involved with drugs or alcohol.. 76 
Jail sentence of parent for over one year 75 
Marital separation of parents............ 69 
Death of a brother or sister............. 68 
Change in acceptance by peers............ 67 
Pregnancy of unwed sister................ 64 
Discovery of being an adopted child...... 63 
Marriage of parent to step-parent........ 63 
Death of a close friend.................. 63 
Having a visible congenital deformity.... 62 
Serious illness requiring hospitalization 58 
Failure of a grade in school............. 56 
Not making an extracurricular activity .. 55 
Hospitalization of a parent.............. 55 
Jail sentence of parent for over 30 days. 53 
Breaking up with boyfriend or girlfriend. 53 
Beginning to date........................ 51 
Suspension from school................... 50 
Birth of a brother or sister............. 50 
Increase in arguments between parents.... 47 
Loss of job by parent.................... 46 
Outstanding personal achievement......... 46 
Change in parent's financial status...... 45 
Accepted at a college of your choice..... 43 
Being a senior in high school............ 42 
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Hospitalization of a sibling............. 41 
Increased absence of parent from home.... 38 
Brother or sister leaving home........... 37 
Addition of third adult to family........ 34 
Become a full fledged member of a church  31 
Decrease in arguments between parents.... 27 
Decrease in arguments with parents....... 26 
Mother or father beginning work.......... 26 
Score 300+: Be extremely careful 
------ you are at a greatly increased risk of serious illness (reduce stress now!). 
Score 150-299+: Be cautious  
------ your risk of illness is moderate (reduced by 30% from the above risk). 
Score 150-: Be glad 
------- you only have a slight risk of illness (but still need to take care of yourself!). 
NOTE: Since individual responses vary so greatly, your score is only a crude 





























0 No Breathlessness* At All 
0.5 Very Very Slight (Just Noticeable) 
1 Very Slight 
2 Slight  Breathlessness 
3 Moderate 
4 Some What Severe 
5 Severe Breathlessness 
6   
7 Very Severe 
Breathlessness 
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APPENDIX D 
SEA STATE PICTURES 
 
 





Sea State 1 
 
 










































 Excerpt of Task Force Smith from the Army Magazine, February 2002 
OUTNUMBERED 50 TO 1, TASK FORCE SMITH WAS THE FIRST TO STOP 
THE REDS IN THE WAR'S MOST CRUCIAL BATTLE. 
 
This is the epic story, told here for the first time, of the first handful of American 
ground troops ordered into combat in Korea. 
They were only 406 men, dug in on a hill near Osan, but they blasted hell out of 
20,000 on rushing communist troops spearheaded by 33 Russian-made T-34 tanks.   
With their seven-hour gory stand on Heartbreak Highway, Task Force Smith, - 
consisting of only two under strength American rifle companies-forced the Reds to slow 
down their headlong assault, deploy their forces and thus lose the impetus that would 
have carried them to the docks of Pusan just a few days after the outbreak of war.  
In what may have been the seven most crucial hours of that war, Task Force 
Smith changed the pattern of the whole conflict and perhaps the course of history.  
Of the 406 grim and ill-equipped American who manned that hill near Osan, only 
250 came out alive. 
 
"The Lid Has Blown Off" 
 
LTC Charles Bradford Smith, scrappy 34-year-old commander of the 1st 
Battalion, 21st Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, was asleep when the phone call came 
through:  "Brad, the lid has blown off.  Get on your fighting clothes and report to the 
C>.P."  The routine seemed familiar.  Smith, a West Pointer, had been routed out of bed 
at Pearl Harbor to rush his 120 infantrymen to defend an eight-mile stretch of Hawaiian 
beach.  Now it was Korea. 
This was on June 30th, four days after the Reds started their invasion of South 
Korea.  The 24th Division was stationed at Kyushu, southernmost island of Japan.  Less 
than 12 hours after orders left Washington authorizing the use of U.S. troops, C-54's 
began landing Smith's battalion on a rain-soaked runway 13 miles out of Pusan, Korea.  
On the wall of a barracks, one of Smith's men found time to scribble this classic little 
jingle: 
 "Clap your hands and jump for joy. 
 You were here before Kilroy!"  
 
There was little joy among this meager, jittery vanguard of the great army that 
was to halt the Reds.  The men were wet, tired, bewildered.  Swept from a quiet spot in 
peaceful Japan, they are being tossed to an enemy they knew nothing about in a sickening 
country, in a confusing mysterious war.  And yet this understrength battalion and its 19 
jeeps represented the hope of 53 United Nations countries to held the Red forces plunging 
toward Pusan. 
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The Battalion was "Red Hot" 
Only about one in seven of the men were combat veterans; the rest were green.  
The bulk of the riflemen, machine gunners and mortar men were 20 years old or less.  
But the battalion had reached its peak of training; in Army par lance, 1st Battalion, 21st 
Regiment, was "red hot." 
Supporting the riflemen were four heavy machine guns, two 75mm recoilless 
rifles, six bazookas, two mortars, and a promise and a prayer that a battery of artillery 
would join them soon. 
Major General William F. Dean, commander of the 24th (later captured by the 
Reds), had said to Smith: "When you get to Pusan, commandeer trucks, trains, anything 
else you can get your hands on.  Head for Taejon.  We've got to block the main Seoul-
Pusan road as far north as possible." 
There was no other information; no estimate of the enemy situation; no indication 
of what would be on the battalion's flanks; and no idea of when it could expect any 
reinforcements. 
At Taejon, Smith met Brig. Gen. John Church, MacArthur's advance commander 
in Korea.  "Well, Smith, we have a little action up here," said Church, pointing on a map 
to a strip of main highway south of Seoul.  "All we need is an outfit up there that won't 
run when they see tanks." 
Smith decided to look over the land he was to defend.  Taking a handful of his 
battalion officers, he drove to a spot north of Osan and surveyed the high ground 
commanding the two avenues of approach into the town.  Jutting out of the rich Uijongbu 
valley was a large hill, flanked on the east side by a railroad and on the west by the main 
highway. 
"If we had to fight in this vicinity, here is the spot we could best defend," Smith 
told his officers.  Then he mapped out supporting fires and final protective lines, 
dovetailed plans for company and platoon defensive positions and covering fires.  
This was to be the first planned American battle line since the end of World War 
II.  
Shortly after midnight, July 4, 1950, all of Task Force Smith moved out to Osan.  
By this time, the Communists had made a clean break-through, and there was 
nothing between Smith and the Red spearhead even to begin to low the enemy down.  
Task Force Smith was the only organized resistance remaining on the bloody highway 
between Seoul and Pusan. 
 
Task Force Smith Digs In 
 
Smith's men moved into their positions rapidly.  Foxholes were dug, 
communication wire was laid, and ammo and rations were unloaded and distributed.  At 
the first light, the men scanned their fields of fire.  In spite of the rain they had about 
10,000 yards' visibility right down the main highway and railroad bed.  Meanwhile, word 
had come through that the promised artillery had showed up - Battery "A" of the 52nd 
Field Artillery was digging in 1500 yards to the rear of Smith's position and was ready to 
start shooting.  By 7:30 A.M., Task Force Smith was trimming up its positions.  It had 
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test- fired its guns and rifles, and the artillery had fired several registrations on likely 
target areas in front of the riflemen's positions. 
"B" Company with supporting elements was assigned to cover it.  "C" Company 
was to cover the railroad.  The second 75mm recoilless rifle was trained down the 
railroad tracks. 
M/Sgt. Harvey Vann, a Texan, had bought a new car in Japan just before the 
battalion was flown to Korea.  Now standing on the hill north of Osan, he offered it for 
sale.  "It's a good buy, men," he assured his dug- in comrades, "and I'm willing to sell it at 
a loss."  He had no takers. 
Daylight brought more rain-and the enemy.  The weather doused any hope of air 
support for the defense. 
At 7:30 A.M., July 5th, the communists struck.  A column of thirty-three Russian-
made T-34 tanks came rumbling out of Suwon down the highway toward the Americans 
on the hill. 
Task Force Smith trained all its guns on the enemy.  The artillery opened up at 
Colonel' Smith's call, but the infantry held its fire, waiting for the order to shoot.  The 
initial enemy fire attack came when the tanks were about 1500 yards.  They approached 
without caution, apparently not expecting to run into a force that would stand and fight.  
"They couldn't have been surprised that we were on the hill," Smith recounted. 
"After all, we made plenty of noise when we test- fired and registered our guns at 
daybreak.  They must have heard us." 
 
The Communists Blast Our Hill 
 
The American artillery continued to fire as the T-34's paused on the winding 
highway to pour shells into the U.S. Positions.  Smith ordered the fire of the 75 recoilless 
rifles held until 700 yards range because of the shortage of ammunition.  For the rest of 
the infantry-men, the order was; "Don't shoot till you see the slant of their eyes!' 
The tanks came on. 
Sergeant Pugh was in command of the 75mm rifle responsible for the highway.  
When the back blast of his gun immediately disclosed his position to the oncoming tanks, 
the Communists blasted his position, killing one soldier and wounding another.  The 
sergeant and his remaining men moved the gun about 100 feet and resumed firing, 
continuing until their ammunition was exhausted.  Because the bulk of their ammunition 
was the wrong type (probably high explosive and not armor piercing) no visible damage 
was done by their fire.  The tanks were slowed down, but they weren't stopped.  For an 
hour, they inched forward toward the American positions. 
The tragedy of the defense was the failure of the anti- tank rockets to knock off the 
lead tank.  Moving under the direction of LT. Janson Cox. A Missourian who has since 
been reported mission in action, the bazooka teams edged down to the road to engage the 
tanks.  "It was heart breaking," reported Capt. Doody of "B" Company, "to watch those 
men firing pointblank and doing little damage.  Rockets hit the tanks in the tracks, turrets 
and bogies, and still couldn't stop them!" 
Lieutenant Ollie Conner, standing behind a knocked-out vehicle, fired 22 rockets 
from about 15 feet into the tanks as they went by.  He stood upright in the smoke and 
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rain, defying the enemy tankers, and cursing as his shots, all excellent hits by World War 
II standard, failed to cripple the tankers.  Yet before his ammo was gone, Conner 
managed to knock out two or the tanks, a feat for which he later was awarded the Silver 
Star. 
There were no live demolitions or mines to hinder the enemy.  The tanks moved 
right through the ail of fire coming down on them from the hill. 
"If one anti- tank crew had been able to pick off the lead and rear tank, the others 
would have been sitting ducks," reported Lt. Col. Miller Perry, the artillery commander, 
as he recounted the action. "Four or five tanks, all medium, just sat near our positions 
with their hatches battened down, blasting away at our line.  The infantry took a terrific 
pounding as the other tanks came down the road.  The tanks swung their turrets on our 
artillery positions, letting us have it.  In a direct fire duel at 100 yards range, we struck 
back with our 105's and stopped four of them." 
 
Battle Was Costly 
 
Colonel Smith moved from company to company to make sure his men held their 
positions in the tank attack.  It wasn't easy for some men.  When Smith passed the gun 
emplacement of a young Iowan, Pfc. John Crespo, a 60mm mortarman, Crespo held up 
the bipod.  It had been shattered by shell fragments, "What do I do now?" he asked.  
Crespo fought on as a rifleman, but following that engagement was reported missing in 
action. 
Not far from Crespo, Bard Smith could see the rest of the 60mm mortar team, 
blasted by tank fire.  Sgt. Calvin Patterson of Oregon had been struck in the neck with 
shell fragments, but refused evacuation to the aid station.  "We won't get out anyway," he 
explained.  He stayed with the small mortars until out of ammunition and then directed 
his platoon, including Crespo, as riflemen. 
The hour- long tank battle had been costly.  About 20 Americans had been killed 
and wounded holding their positions as the tanks went through and past them; leaving six 
burning hulls on the road.  Task Force Smith had been ordered to hold.  General Church 
had said, "All we need is an outfit up there that won't run when they see tanks."  Task 
Force Smith did not run. 
But the main attack had not yet been launched.  On the road south from Suwon, 
10,000 yards away, the Americans could see countless trucks loaded with troops.  Why 
they did not dismount and fight with the tanks is a mystery to Smith.  Had they fought as 
a tank-infantry team, Task Forces Smith would have been slaughtered in the first assault. 
Forty-five minutes after the tanks had passed through Task Force Smith's 
position, the trucks started up.  They rolled along the highway much as the tanks had.  
None of the troops got out ahead to scout the ground. 
A column of enemy five miles long came out in the open, and when the leading 
elements were within 1000 yards, Task Force Smith "threw the book at them."  The 
column was raked with machine gun, mortar and artillery fire.  Trucks went up in flames.  
Enemy dead and wounded cluttered the road.  Others fled in panic into adjacent rice 
paddies.  This was not the war the Reds had been used to during the past several days. 
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The enemy's approach was slowed down, which gave Task Force smith a chance 
to consolidate its positions and move up more ammunition.  They discovered then that 
the tanks had shot up many of the 19 jeeps, which had been pooled in the rear. 
The tanks continued to speed down the main highway toward Pyongtaek while 
Task Force smith engaged the infantrymen to the front.  As the T-34's rolled by they tore 
up the communications lines to the artillery batter.  This destroyed the last 
communications Smith had, other than messengers.  Most of his jeeps were gone, his 
radios, were inoperative from the constant rain, and now the tanks had chewed up his 
wire. 
The artillery was 100 yards off the road in position when the tanks went by.  They 
suffered only a few casualties, including Col. Perry, the artillery commander who 
received a shell fragment in the knee. 
 
Reds Collect Their Wits 
 
Once the tanks cleared, Task Force Smith never saw or heard of them again.  
What the advance guard of Americans did not know was that by this time the 1st 
Battalion, 34th Infantry of the 24th division commanded by Lt. Col. "Red" Ayers, was 
approaching a new line near Pyongtaek to fight the first in a planned series of long 
delaying actions.  The T-34's were rolling head on into this force as the Red Infantry 
men, several miles behind the tanks, were collecting their wits.  The initial shock against 
Task Force Smith had been severe for them.  Losses were great. 
"It seemed that we mowed down hundreds, but it was hard to tell, " Smith said.  
By 10:45 A.M., the Reds resumed the offensive, this time dismounted.  Artillery and 
mortar fire began to fall on the U.S. position.  From under this cover, swarms of 
communist soldiers 1000 yards form Task Force Smith fanned out in a wide enveloping 
movement, sweeping in from the east and west up the far sloes of the hill. Task Force 
Smith held tenaciously, fighting off wave after wave. 
Smith decided that the only way to prolong survival was to bring his forces 
together on one side of the road and fight in a perimeter defense, Indian fashion, al long 
as he could.  But getting his men across the road was difficult.  The highway was covered 
by a screen of enemy fire, and the enemy had already set up machine guns on the slopes 
immediately below the American positions. 
Dug in on the slopes overlooking the Reds was quiet, determined Pfc. Florentine 
Gonzales.  He was a machine gunner who had always said he would never leave his 
machine gun.  He had all but hand- carried the weapon from Japan to that hill, and now as 
the enemy came in his sights he splattered them with a fury of rime.  As his buddies tried 
to close into the defense perimeter Gonzales covered them, yelling encouragement as he 
traversed his gun across the ranks of the attacking communists.  By the time the last 
American dashed across the road under Gonzales' covering fire, they noticed that he was 
bleeding from head to chest.  But his gun was still pouring out a volley of death.  He 
clung to his gun, half-blind with blood and rage.  All the strength he had left in his body 
was on the handgrip of his machine gun as the Communists swarmed his position.  (He 
was later reported as a captive by the enemy). 
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The perimeter was established but by 1:30 in the afternoon, with one quarter of its 
force wounded or killed, very little ammunition left, no communications and no 
transportation, Task Force Smith was virtually surrounded.  The only are from which it 
was not getting a heavy volume of fire was to the right rear. 
 
Gets No Support 
 
There was no air support, not even a liaison cub plane to guide Task Force Smith 
out of this hell.  There was no hope of any ground support punching its way through to 
them, not while 27 Russian tanks were on the highway between Osan and Pyongtaek.  
The road was under fire, preventing any opportunity to open wire communications to the 
artillery. 
Sergeant First Class Loran Chambers of Mt. Sterling, IL, was a rough-tough 
soldier.  In World War II he had collected five Purple Hearts, and this was the day for his 
sixth combat wound.  He was a platoon guide in "C" Company, directing all available fire 
on the attacking North Koreans.  A gruff, profane, but colorful sergeant, Chambers called 
back over the sound-power telephone for some 60mm mortar support.  The answer came 
back, "Won't reach that far." 
 
 "How about some81's?" Chambers shouted. 
 "We don't have any." 
 "Well, for C----- sake, throw in some 4.2's" 
"We're out of that, too," came the plaintive response from the mortar 
platoon.  
 Then Cambers asked, "How about the artillery?" 
 "No communications." 
 "How about the Air Force?" 
 "We don't know where they are." 
 "Then, dammit, call the Navy!" Chambers demanded. 
 "They can't reach this far." 
 Chambers was exasperated but not undone.  "Send me a camera," he 
yelled over the phone, "I want to take a picture of this." 
 
A few minutes later Chambers was struck by mortar fragments, for his sixth 
Purple Heart.  He went on to earn five more Purple Hearts and a commission and was 
rotated home before his luck ran out. 
At 2:30 Colonel smith issued orders to his companies to fight their way through 
the light spray of fire to the right rear.  "B" Company would cover the withdrawal as "C" 
Company with attachments, the medics, the walking wounded and Battalion 
Headquarters fought their way southward toward a smaller hill to the rear.  From here 
"C" company would in turn support the withdrawal of "B" Company. 
The positions were littered with American dead.  There were many critically 
wounded men lying on litters, on the ground and in the air station.  Use of the few 
remaining jeeps for evacuation purposes was impossible, as the enemy controlled the 
road, and the rice paddies were rich with mud and fertilizer.  Litter bearers carrying 
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wounded through hip-deep mud in the rice paddies would have progressed so slowly that 
the bearers themselves would certainly have become casualties. 
"That's the worst part of a deal like that," Smith said, "to leave wounded and 
dying men yelling for you to help them, and there was no way to help them.  We had a lot 
of casualties getting out of that position, how many I don't know." 
One of Smith's Lieutenants, hurt badly, was dragging himself to the rear.  There 
were six men lying on the ground, unable to walk.  "Lieutenant, what is going to happen 
to us?" one of them cried out.  The lieutenant passed him a hand grenade. "This is the 
best I can do for you." 
 
Machine Gun Is Silenced 
 
The withdrawal was made more difficult by an enemy machine gun nest 40 yards 
away from the route.  It sprayed the hillside and rice paddies every time one of the 
infantrymen tried to move. 
 
This murderous gun wasn't silenced until Lt. Raymond E. "Bodie" Adams, of 
Baltimore, Maryland, star pitcher and captain of the regimental baseball team, tossed a 
grenade 40 yards directly into the gun nest and destroyed the position.  Bodie Adams, 
who had to take considerable risk and fully expose himself, got the Silver Star for this 
action. 
There was no indication of where the tanks had gone and Smith did not know how 
large a force he was fighting.  Actually it was two divisions, led by the tank spearhead 
that hit him seven hours earlier.  Now these two divisions-about 20,000 men-had already 
suffered thousands of casualties and were fully deployed along the strategic Seoul-Pusan 
highway. 
"In an obviously hopeless situation with many casualties, no communications, no 
transportation, ammo gone and the enemy tanks now well behind me, I was faced with a 
decision:  what the hell to do?  To stand and die or try to get the remains of my task force 
out of there.  I could last, at best, only another hour and then lose everything I had.  I 
chose to try to get out in hopes that we would live to fight again another day," Smith said. 
Smith gave orders to his men to try and find their way to friendly positions.  
Certainly other U.S. units were set up by now.  He told his men to assemble in company 
groups.  The situation on the distant flanks and rear were unknown.  It seemed reasonable 
to expect that other enemy units were advancing down parallel roads.  The ammunition 
was exhausted, and Smith felt that small groups of five or six unarmed men would have 
better chances of survival than company-size groups of unarmed men.  "Meet me at 
Chonan 20 miles south of here.  Keep off the main roads.  Good luck." 
 
Some Men Made It 
 
Some men walked 60 miles, wading through muddy and malodorous rice paddies 
and over mountains to get to that position, but they made it.  Others never made it.  Lt. 
Col. Smith with four or five volunteers sloshed through open rice paddies in hip-deep 
mud to notify the artillery battery that the infantry was pulling out.  Because of lack of 
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communications, there was no other way to notify the artillerymen who were still in good 
shape and had lost no equipment.  This seemed a miracle, since Task Force Smith had 
observed the tanks firing at 100-yard range into the battery position. 
For several days men of the battalion filtered back to the rear.  Perhaps most 
unusual odyssey of escape was the story of Sgt. William F. Smith.  Hiding out behind 
enemy lines, he worked his way with the aid or friendly South Koreans to the west coast, 
where fishermen took him south by boat.  About two weeks later, he regained friendly 
lines where he was hospitalized with a case of pneumonia. 
Captain William "Chief" Wyrick, a good infantryman with some Indian blood in 
him, took a small group south across the railroad tracks.  Wyrick moved east with his 
group, which included the chaplain.  They ran into a group of about ten Koreans.  Not 
knowing whether they were South or North Koreans, they forced the natives to join them.  
They struck out for Ansong and from there south to Chonan.  The further they went he 
more disorderly the march became.  However, they managed to take care of the wounded, 
feeding them rice balls which were provided by the Koreans, who turned out to be 
friendly, and eventually made their way to Chonan. 
The artillery battery moved out in its trucks, leaving in their wake destroyed 
equipment.  En route over open country and back roads the trucks picked up all the 
infantrymen they could locate.  On July 6 about 185 men from Task Force Smith had 
reassembled as instructed at Chonan, ready for what might come. 
 
Not Yet Out of Trouble 
 
Task Force Smith still wasn't out of trouble.  As the men straggled into Chonan, 
they were directed to a schoolhouse where they hoped to rest and get cleaned up a bit.  
Just as Smith had gotten out of his dirty fatigues, he received word that the town was now 
"No-man's land" - in other words, in front of the front lines! 
Smith hurriedly dressed and together with some of his men dashed into the town, 
hoping to scrounge some trucks.  There he saw his "C" Company Commander, Capt. 
Richard W. Dashner, of Waco, Texas, with a group of 65 men who had just arrived.  This 
brought the survival total to 250 exhausted men.  Smith told them to stand fast right 
where they were while he continued on in search of trucks. 
Going to the railroad station, Smith and his group were fortunate in securing four 
trucks from the South Koreans and were also able to borrow six more trucks from the 
Service Company of the 34th Infantry, which was in the process of moving supplies to 
the south. 
Task Force Smith-now 250 strong-got on the trucks and on General Barth's order 
proceeded to Taejon for rest and equipment.  About 155 men were killed, wounded or 
mission in the seven-hour fight at Osan. 
But the enemy tanks, which sped down the main highway through Smith's 
positions while Task Force smith held its ground, were in far worse trouble.  For one 
thing they had taken serious losses for the first time since they launched their aggression.  
Six tanks were a lot of casualties of the 33 tanks in the short fight.  They did not know 
how large or small a force they had hit. 
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Moreover, the Red tankers did not know what was holding up their infantrymen to 
the rear and therefore, did not dare attack without infantry the positions at Pyongtaek held 
by the 34th Regiment. 
The 34th got a break then, in that it was able to move back to a position just south 
of Chonan with little trouble and there set up a better position for delay. 
 
Task Force Loses Identity 
 
Task Force Smith-what remained of it-was soon reunited with other units of the 
1st Battalion and lost forever its identity as Task Force Smith.  It became once again the 
1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division.  Its valiant men went right back into 
battle, no longer green kids but bitter and hardened combat veterans.  They now know 
what kind of an enemy they were facing in the swarming hordes of fanatical communists 
who were determined to drive them from Korea. 
It was a long time before any of the men of Task Force Smith realized what they 
had accomplished.  When they had time to reflect, or when some one who knew "the big 
picture" explained it to them, they could realize the magnitude of their success.  With 406 
men they had forced two North Korean tank- led divisions to slow down a drive that 
would have easily brought them to Pusan, for on July 5th no firm defense was set up 
anywhere behind Task Force smith to stop the Reds. 
Two days later, when General MacArthur announced in Tokyo, "The enemy have 
lost their opportunity for victory in Korea by deploying too soon," he was thinking about 
Task Force Smith.  He was thinking about the momentous decision which had sent a 
handful of men against 20,000 well-trained, well-equipped Communists.  He was 
thinking about Brad Smith's decision to stand at Osan. 
It was the seven-hour fight of Task Force Smith at Osan that gave the free world 















Excerpt from the website for the Battle of Midway 
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/midway/midway.htm 
BATTLE OF MIDWAY, 4-7 JUNE 1942 
 
The Battle of Midway, fought over and near the tiny U.S. mid-Pacific base at 
Midway atoll, represents the strategic high water mark of Japan's Pacific Ocean war. 
Prior to this action, Japan possessed general naval superiority over the United States and 
could usually choose where and when to attack. After Midway, the two opposing fleets 
were essentially equals, and the United States soon took the offensive. 
Japanese Combined Fleet commander Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto moved on 
Midway in an effort to draw out and destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet's aircraft carrier 
striking forces, which had embarrassed the Japanese Navy in the mid-April Doolittle 
Raid on Japan's home islands and at the Battle of Coral Sea in early May. He planned to 
quickly knock down Midway's defenses, follow up with an invasion of the atoll's two 
small islands and establish a Japanese air base there. He expected the U.S. carriers to 
come out and fight, but to arrive too late to save Midway and in insufficient strength to 
avoid defeat by his own well-tested carrier air power. 
Yamamoto's intended surprise was thwarted by superior American 
communications intelligence, which deduced his scheme well before battle was joined. 
This allowed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, to establish 
an ambush by having his carriers ready and waiting for the Japanese. On 4 June 1942, in 
the second of the Pacific War's great carrier battles, the trap was sprung. The 
perseverance, sacrifice and skill of U.S. Navy aviators, plus a great deal of good luck on 
the American side, cost Japan four irreplaceable fleet carriers, while only one of the three 
U.S. carriers present was lost. The base at Midway, though damaged by Japanese air 
attack, remained operational and later became a vital component in the American trans-
Pacific offensive. 
 
U.S. FORCES ASSEMBLE FOR ACTION, 26 MAY - 3 JUNE 1942 
 
By mid-May 1942 U.S. Pacific Fleet codebreakers, directed by Lieutenant 
Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, were reporting that the Japanese planned to attack 
somewhere in the Hawaiian area, as well as in the Aleutians. The carrier Yorktown (CV-
5), damaged earlier in the month at the Battle of Coral sea, was already on the way back 
to Pearl Harbor for repairs. Now, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet's 
commander, recalled his other operational carrier group, Vice Admiral William F. 
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Halsey's Task Force 16 (TF-16), which had gone to the South Pacific after it launched the 
Doolittle raid on 18 April. 
 
Halsey's two carriers, Enterprise (CV-6) and Hornet (CV-8), arrived at Pearl 
Harbor on 26 May, by which time intelligence was certain that Midway was the Japanese 
target. Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance relieved the ailing Halsey in command, as 
TF-16 busily got ready to steam the thousand miles up to the Midway area. When it left 
port on 28 April, the damaged Yorktown was receiving urgent repairs. In a remarkable 
feat, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard workers had her ready in time to sail with Rear Admiral 
Frank Jack Fletcher's Task Force 17 (TF-17) on the 30th. Yorktown received a new air 
group, formerly belonging to USS Saratoga (CV-3), though some elements of her 
previous air squadrons remained on board. 
 
These late May departures beat the Japanese to the punch. They had planned to 
place submarines to watch for an American sortie from Pearl Harbor, but didn't expect 
that to happen so soon, and the Japanese subs were not yet on station. Admiral Nimitz, 
whose intelligence had given him the enemy's plans, took care to cover Midway and its 
approaches with a strong force of his own submarines. 
 
After refueling at sea, TF-16 and TF-17 rendezvoused some three hundred miles 
northeast of Midway on 2 June and prepared to meet the Japanese. Search flights were 
sent out to guard against unexpected developments. Spruance and Fletcher planned to 
operate their forces separately, though never very far apart. Their presence unsuspected 
by the enemy, they were in position to make a surprise flank attack on the Japanese 




Midway is a small atoll nearly halfway across the Pacific, the westernmost 
inhabited member of the Hawaiian Island chain. Its two major islands, Sand and Eastern, 
have a combined area of only a few square miles. They are densely populated by several 
bird species, of which the most abundant is the Laysan Albatross, popularly nicknamed 
the "Gooney Bird". 
 
First visited in 1859, Midway formally became a United States' possession in 
1867. A trans-pacific cable station was established there in 1903. In 1935, Pan American 
Airways built a way station on Sand Island to support its new seaplane route between the 
U.S. and Asia. Midway was recommended as a patrol plane and submarine base in a 
1938-39 study of national defense needs, and construction of a U.S. Navy base began 
soon thereafter. This included a seaplane hangar and other facilities on Sand Island and 
an airfield on the smaller Eastern Island. 
 
Two Japanese Destroyers bombarded the new base on 7 December 1941, causing 
damage to some buildings and destroying one patrol plane. With the fall of Wake later in 
the month, Midway became the westernmost U.S. outpost in the Central Pacific. Land-
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based bombers and fighters were stationed on Eastern Island. U.S. Marines provided 
defensive artillery and infantry. Operating from Sand Island and the atoll's lagoon, PBY 
"Catalina" seaplanes actively patrolled toward the Japanese-held Marshall Islands and 
Wake, checking on enemy activities and guarding against further enemy attacks on 
Hawaii. There were occasional clashes when planes from Midway and those from the 
Japanese islands met over the Pacific. 
 
Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz inspected Midway in early 
May 1942, conferring with the local commanders, Navy Captain Cyril T. Simard and 
Marine Colonel Harold D. Shannon. As the Japanese threat to Midway became known 
during that month, Nimitz increased its ground and air forces, the latter to the point where 
Eastern Island was crowded with Marine Corps, Navy and Army Air Force planes. 
Several PT boats were sent to improve seaward defenses. By 4 June 1942, Midway was 
as ready as possible to face the oncoming Japanese. 
 
The Battle of Midway, 1942  
 
The Doolittle Raid on Japan in April 1942 shook 
the Japanese military establishment that previously 
believed their homeland immune from air attack. 
To defend Japan they must extend their defensive 
perimeter eastward. Midway, a tiny island a 
thousand miles from Hawaii, became the target.  
The Japanese threw almost the entire Imperial Fleet 
into the battle - six aircraft carriers, eleven 
battleships, thirteen cruisers, forty-five destroyers, 
assorted submarines, transports and mine sweepers. 
The Americans had cracked the Japanese code and 
knew something was up. The thin American 
defense consisted of three aircraft carriers (Hornet, Enterprise and Yorktown), eight 
cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and the aircraft stationed on Midway itself. The Yorktown, 
mauled in the Battle of the Coral Sea, limped into battle after band-aid repairs at Pearl 
Harbor.  
The Americans had surprise on their side, and luck. On June 4, they discovered 
the Japanese fleet northeast of Midway. An air battle quickly developed. The turning 
point came at mid-morning. The Japanese fighters were drawn down to sea level by 
attacking American torpedo bombers, all of which were lost. Their sacrifice cleared the 
skies above for the American dive-bombers. Within minutes three Japanese carriers were 
ablaze. Hiryu, the fourth Japanese carrier retaliated with an air attack sinking the 
Yorktown. That afternoon American aircraft caught the Hiryu, inflicting serious damage. 
The Japanese fleet retreated. The one-day battle reversed the tide of war in the Pacific, 
six months after Pearl Harbor. From that point on, Japan would be on the defensive.  
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Under Attack 
Alerted of Japanese plans through intercepted messages, an American Task Force 
awaited the enemy steaming towards Midway. The Japanese struck first with an attack on 
the island. The Americans located the Japanese fleet in the early morning and 
commenced a costly air strike that only 6 of the attacking 41 torpedo bombers survived. 
Mitsuo Fuchida witnessed the battle from the deck of the aircraft carrier Akagi:  
"The first enemy carrier planes to attack were 15 torpedo bombers. When first 
spotted by our screening ships and combat air patrol, they were still not visible from the 
carriers, but they soon appeared as tiny dark specks in the blue sky, a little above the 
horizon, on Akagi's starboard bow. The distant wings flashed in the sun. Occasionally one 
of the specks burst into a spark of flame and trailed black smoke as it fell into the water. 
Our fighters were on the job, and the enemy again seemed to be without fighter 
protection.  
Presently a report came in from a Zero group leader: 'All 15 enemy torpedo 
bombers shot down.' Nearly 50 Zeros had gone to intercept the unprotected enemy 
formation! Small wonder that it did not get through.  
Again at 0930 a lookout atop the bridge 
yelled: 'Enemy torpedo bombers, 30 degrees to 
starboard, coming in low!' This was followed 
by another cry from a port lookout forward: 
'Enemy torpedo planes approaching 40 degrees 
to port!'  
The raiders closed in from both sides, 
barely skimming over the water. Flying in 
single columns, they were within five miles 
and seemed to be aiming straight for Akagi. I 
watched in breathless suspense, thinking how 
impossible it would be to dodge all their 
torpedoes. But these raiders, too, without 
protective escorts, were already being engaged 
by our fighters. On Akagi's flight deck all 
attention was fixed on the dramatic scene unfolding before us, and there was wild 
cheering and whistling as the raiders went down one after another.  
Of the 14 enemy torpedo bombers which came in from starboard, half were shot 
down, and only 5 remained of the original 12 planes to port. The survivors kept charging 
in as Akagi's opened fire with antiaircraft machine guns.  
Both enemy groups reached their release points, and we watched for the splash of 
torpedoes aimed at Akagi. But, to our surprise, no drops were made. At the last moment 
the planes appeared to forsake Akagi, zoomed overhead, and made for Hiryu to port and 
astern of us. As the enemy planes passed Akagi, her gunners regained their composure 
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and opened a sweeping fire, in which Hiryu joined. Through all this deadly gunfire the 
Zeros kept after the Americans, continually reducing their number.  
Seven enemy planes finally succeeded in launching their torpedoes at Hiryu, five 
from her starboard side and two from port. Our Zeros tenaciously pursued the retiring 
attackers as far as they could. Hiryu turned sharply to starboard to evade the torpedoes, 
and we watched anxiously to see if any would find their mark. A deep sigh of relief went 
up when no explosion occurred, and Hiryu soon turned her head to port and resumed her 
original course. A total of more than 40 enemy torpedo planes had been thrown against us 
in these attacks, but only seven American planes had survived long enough to release 
their missiles, and not a single hit had been scored. Nearly all of the raiding enemy planes 
were brought down."  
Five Minutes That Changed The War 
The Japanese were now caught in a logistical nightmare. Wanting to follow up on 
their earlier attack on Midway, they armed their bombers with bombs. However, in the 
midst of battle, scouts spotted the American Fleet, so the bombers were ordered refitted 
with torpedoes. Simultaneously, the Zeros defending the Fleet returned to their carriers 
for rearming and refueling. At this moment, more American attackers appeared, 
Commander Fuchida continues his story:  
"Preparations for a counter-strike against the enemy had continued on board our 
four carriers throughout the enemy torpedo attacks. One after another, planes were 
hoisted from the hangar and quickly arranged on the flight deck. There was no time to 
lose. At 1020 Admiral Nagumo gave the order to launch when ready. On Akagi's flight 
deck all planes were in position with engines warming up. The big ship began turning 
into the wind. Within five minutes all her planes would be launched.  
Five minutes! Who would have dreamed that the tide of battle would shift 
completely in that brief interval of time?  
Visibility was good. Clouds were 
gathering at about 3,000 meters, however, and 
though there were occasional breaks, they 
afforded good concealment for approaching 
enemy planes. At 1024 the order to start 
launching came from the bridge by voice-tube. 
The Air Officer flapped a white flag, and the 
first Zero fighter gathered speed and whizzed 
off the deck. At that instant a lookout screamed: 'Hell-divers!' I looked up to see three 
black enemy planes plummeting toward our ship. Some of our machine guns managed to 
fire a few frantic bursts at them, but it was too late. The plump silhouettes of the 
American 'Dauntless' dive-bombers quickly grew larger, and then a number of black 
objects suddenly floated eerily from their wings. Bombs! Down they came straight 
toward me! I fell intuitively to the deck and crawled behind a command post mantelet 
(rolled mattresses providing protection from shrapnel).  
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The terrifying scream of the dive-bombers reached me first, followed by the 
crashing explosion of a direct hit. There was a blinding flash and then a second 
explosion, much louder than the first. I was shaken by a weird blast of warm air. There 
was still another shock, but less severe, apparently a near miss. Then followed a startling 
quiet as the barking of guns suddenly ceased. I got up and looked at the sky. The enemy 
planes were already gone from sight.  
The attackers had gotten in unimpeded 
because our fighters, which had engaged the 
preceding wave of torpedo planes only a few 
moments earlier, had not yet had time to 
regain altitude. 
Consequently, it may be said that the 
American dive-bombers' success was made 
possible by the earlier martyrdom of their 
torpedo planes. Also, our carriers had no time 
to evade because clouds hid the enemy's 
approach until he dove down to the attack. We 
had been caught flatfooted in the most vulnerable condition possible - decks loaded with 
planes armed and fueled for attack. 
Looking about, I was horrified at the destruction that had been wrought in a 
matter of seconds. There was a huge hole in the flight deck just behind the amidship 
elevator. The elevator itself, twisted like molten glass, was drooping into the hangar. 
Deck plates reeled upward in grotesque configurations. Planes stood tail up, belching 
livid flame and jet-black smoke. Reluctant tears streamed down my cheeks as I watched 
the fires spread, and I was terrified at the prospect of induced explosions which would 
surely doom the ship." 
References:  
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Excerpt from the website of the Battle of Kursk at 
http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/ 
THE BATTLE OF KURSK 
 
Following their disastrous defeat at Stalingrad during the winter of 1942-43, the 
German armed forces launched a climactic offensive in the East known as Operation 
Citadel on July 4,1943. The climax of Operation Citadel, the Battle of Kursk, involved as 
many as 6,000 tanks, 4,000 aircraft and 2 million fighting men and is remembered as the 
greatest tank battle in history. The high-water mark of the battle was the massive armor 
engagement at Prochorovka (also spelled Prokhorovka), which began on July 12. But 
while historians have categorized Prochorovka as a victory of improved Soviet tactics 
over German firepower and heavy tanks, new evidence casts the struggle at the "gully of 
death" in a very different light.  
The Germans' goal during Citadel was to pinch off a large salient in the Eastern 
Front that extended 70 miles toward the west. Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's Army 
Group Center would attack from the north flank of the bulge, with Colonel General 
Walther Model's Ninth Army leading the effort, General Hans Zorn's XLVI Panzer Corps 
on the right flank and Maj. Gen. Josef Harpe's XLI Panzer Corps on the left. General 
Joachim Lemelsen's XLVII Panzer Corps planned to drive toward Kursk and meet up 
with Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South, Col. Gen. Hermann Hoth's 
Fourth Panzer Army and the Kempf Army, commanded by General Werner Kempf.  
Opposing the German forces were the Soviet Central Front, led by General 
Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, and the Voronezh Front, led by General Nikolai F. Vatutin. 
The Central Front, with the right wing strengthened by Lt. Gen. Nikolai P. Pukhov's 
Thirteenth Army and Lt. Gen. I.V. Galinin's Seventeenth Army, was to defend the 
northern sector. To the south, the Voronezh Front faced the German Army Group South 
with three armies and two in reserve. The Sixth Guards Army, led by Lt. Gen. Mikhail N. 
Chistyakov, and the Seventh Guards Army, led by Lt. Gen. M. S. Shumilov, held the 
center and left wing. East of Kursk, Col. Gen. Ivan S. Konev's Steppe Military District 
(renamed Steppe Front on July 10, 1943) was to hold German breakthroughs, then mount 
the counteroffensive.  
The Accountability of the Battle of Kursk 
Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS 
Panzer Corps--available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.--
provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle. These records show, 
first of all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously believed and, 
more important, that they suffered only moderate losses on July 12, 1943. As those 
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reports were intended to allow the corps commander to assess the combat strength of his 
divisions, they can be considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it 
seems that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern flank of 
the salient.  
The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been variously 
reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others have estimated between 300 to 
600. Even before the Battle of Kursk began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 
500 tanks, much less 700. On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched, 
Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them, plus a number of 
command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had a total of 211 operational tanks--
Totenkopf  had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. 
Damaged tanks or tanks undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still 
in action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The battalions that 
were equipped with Panthers were still training in Germany in July 1943.  
On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army reports 
declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks, a net loss of only 48 
tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the discrepancy due to the gain of repaired 
tanks returned to action. Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the 
corps lost about 70 tanks on July 12. In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be 
moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army 
written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to 
repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for 
salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. 
Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the 
huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other 
Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of 
about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, 
the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov 
ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town.  
Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS divisions 
attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane between the Psel and the rail line 
west of Prochorovka. Only Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it 
was the only division to attack the town itself. The II SS Panzer Corps zone of battle, 
contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was approximately nine miles wide, 
with Totenkopf on the left flank, Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right 
flank. Totenkopf 's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in defensive 
action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact, only Leibstandarte actually 
advanced into the corridor west of Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back 
initial Soviet attacks.  
Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud motor noise, 
which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m., hundreds of Soviet tanks, 
carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves 
of T-34 and T-70 tanks advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled 
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Germans. When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck the T-
34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving their infantry behind, the 
T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that survived the initial clash with SS armor 
continued a linear advance and were destroyed by the Germans.  
When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor toward the 
town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve armor. A Soviet attack by the 
181st Tank Regiment was defeated by several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) 
Company of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, 
the most successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in 
flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the Soviet tank 
regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the Tigers over open ground, was 
suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at 
any great distance. The field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the 
Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated. Late in the day, 
Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V Mechanized Corps, which 
finally halted Leibstandarte.  
Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of Prochorovka and 
was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the II Tank Corps and II Guards 
Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused fighting broke out all along the German 
division's axis of advance. Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry 
and ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads. Rotmistrov 
continued to throw armor against the division, and combat raged throughout the day, with 
heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward, advancing 
into the night while suffering relatively light tank losses.  
Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements unsuccessfully 
tried to crush Totenkopf 's bridgehead. The SS division fought off the XXXI and X Tank 
Corps, supported by elements of the XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, 
Totenkopf 's panzer group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka, 
southeast across the river and into Prochorovka.  
The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued 
throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side--contrary to the accounts 
given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front, which state that the fighting 
ended on July 12 with a decisive German defeat. These authors describe the battlefield as 
littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the Soviets overran the 
SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more 
days. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until 
July 16. That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS division on 
July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south of Prochorovka. Totenkopf 
eventually reached the KartaschevkaProchorovka road, and the division took several 
tactically important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those successes were 
not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf Hitler.  
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After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of 
impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel 
Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet 
tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of 
XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used 
to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead 
or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south 
was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet 
defenses. Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet 
operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area. 
Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead, he 
dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the anticipated Soviet 
diversionary attacks south of the BelgorodKharkov sector. On the night of July 17-18, the 
corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka 
ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on 
July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive. The SS panzer 
divisions were still full of fight; in fact, two of them continued to fight effectively in 
southern Russia for the rest of the summer. 
Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf remained in the 
East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division, which replaced Leibstandarte, 
were transferred to the Sixth Army area, where they conducted a counterattack from July 
31 to August 2 that eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without 
pause, the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in early August 
1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were joined by another unit, the 
Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. During three weeks of constant combat, the 
four divisions played a major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk 
counteroffensive, Operation Rumyantsev. They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank 
Army, rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army, now at 542 
tanks. 
By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still running. 
Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of August. While at no time 
did any of the German divisions have more than 55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly 
blunted the thrusts of the two Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several 
rifle corps. 
Totenkopf  repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's thrusts 
toward the KharkovPoltava rail line. Das Reich threw back two Soviet tank corps south 
of Bogodukhov and blunted Rotmistrov's last major attack west of Kharkov, and the III 
Panzer Corps halted Operation Rumyantsev. 
After Kharkov itself fell, however, the German front gradually collapsed. The 
Soviets regrouped, committed additional strong reserves and renewed their attack toward 
the strategically important Dnepr River. Army Group South was subsequently forced to 
abandon much of southern Ukraine in a race for the safety of the Dnepr. Despite the 
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remarkable efforts of the German army and Waffen SS panzer divisions during July and 
August, the Germans were too weak to hold the KharkovBelgorodPoltava sector after 
their summer losses. 
It is apparent from their operations during the late summer that the SS panzer 
divisions were not destroyed at Prochorovka. This reassessment of the battle provides 
food for thought regarding possible German successes if Manstein's panzer reserves had 
been utilized as he had intended. 
To what extent the course of events in Russia would have been changed is, of 
course, unknown, but it is interesting to speculate. If Army Group South's panzer reserve 
had been used to encircle and destroy the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank 
Army, the outcome of the war in Russia might have been significantly different. 
Although it was beyond the German army's capabilities to force a military end to the war 
by the summer of 1943, a limited victory in the south could have resulted in a delay of 
Soviet strategic operations for months or perhaps longer. It is doubtful, however, that this 
pause would have lasted long enough for the Germans to transfer enough forces to the 
West to defeat the June 6, 1944, D-Day invasion. 
But one fact is beyond any question, regardless of the number of tanks possessed 
by the Germans or Soviets or what might have been possible. Due to Hausser's panzer 
corps' failure to take Prochorovka on July 12 and the subsequent misuse of German 
panzer reserves, the momentum of the Fourth Panzer Army was slowed dramatically. 
When Hitler abandoned Operation Citadel on July 13, the Germans' last opportunity to 
influence events on a strategic level in the East was lost. 
It is interesting that the information regarding German tank losses at Prochorovka 
has not been made available before now. Due to the lack of crucial primary-source 
information--especially the records of the II SS Panzer Corps on the Eastern Front--there 
had been no evidence to correct the erroneous accounts and impressions given in 
previous studies of the Eastern Front. 
Waffen SS formations' records of their Eastern Front operations were not 
declassified until 1978-1981. By that time, many of the major works about the Eastern 
Front had already been published. Later authors accepted the accounts of the battle as 
given in the earlier books and failed to conduct additional research. As a result, one of the 
best known of all Eastern Front battles has never been understood properly. Prochorovka 
was believed to have been a significant German defeat but was actually a stunning 
reversal for the Soviets because they suffered enormous tank losses. 
As Manstein suggested, Prochorovka may truly have been a lost German victory, 
thanks to decisions made by Hitler. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the German 
dictator, a foremost proponent of the value of will, lost his own will to fight in southern 
Ukraine in July 1943. Had he allowed Manstein to continue the attack on the two Soviet 
tank armies in the Prochorovka area, Manstein might have achieved a victory even more 
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APPENDIX H 
TASK FORCE SMITH SUMMARY SHEET 
Node Before After
Training
Trained no practice  - it has been noted that 
only one in seven of the men were combat 
veterans; the rest were green.  Most had 
enlisted to escape boredom in small town 
America, yet 43% of the lower ranking 
enlisted soldiers scored in the two lowest 
categories of the Army's qualification tests, 
which denies enlistment to most candidates 
today.
Trained no practice  - it has been noted that only 
one in seven of the men were combat veterans; 
the rest were green.  By the time of engagement, 
there was no preparatory time for senior NCOs to 
train the junior enlisted.  The soldiers would learn 
on the battle field. 
Duration of Operation 
Under Harsh Conditions
Less Than 24 hours - expected to be less 
than one day  because it was hoped that an 
arrogant display of strength would fool the 
enemy into believing that the US had a 
much greater resources at disposal for 
fighting. 
Six Days - the North Koreans decided to stand 
their ground and fight.
Personal Factors Normal stress level for soldier to 
experience going into battle
High stress level after experiencing live 
ammunition being fired at oneself
Leadership Effectiveness
Good - Consistent throughout battle - 
combat experience from WWII was about 
1/3 (Great - 71%)
Good -Gen Dean admitted that the thought of 
failure never crossed his mind.  Overconfidence 
bordering on arrogance was the prevailing mood 
in Far East Command, from Gen. MacArthur 
down to the greenest of COL Smith's riflemen.
Relationship with 
Superiors
Great -Consistent throughout battle - Gen 
Collins stated "Now matured and with 
combat experience back of him, he was well 
qualified to lead the first American army 
troops to fight in the Korean war."
Good -Consistent throughout battle - Gen Collins 
stated "Now matured and with combat 
experience back of him, he was well qualified to 




Good -Troops led to believe that they would 
face an ill-armed peasant army that would 
quit at the first appearance of an American 
uniform.
Good -Troops respected the battalion 
commander by volunteering to stay and complete 
the mission.
Relationship with Peers Average - Supportive based on orders
Average -Supportive of each other because 
soldiers volunteered to stay and detain the 
enemy so that comrades could return to main 
post.
Level of Exertion Moderate at the beginning of battle Difficult as time progressed with less sleep
Fitness Level Fitness level 2 Fitness Level 3
Sleep
Sleep deficit would plague the men since 
they were on alert for 48 hours prior.
Rest
Operational Tempo High -  preparing for deployment. High  
Threat ThreatCon D ThreatCon D
Mission Control Low Risk (37.3%) High Risk
Task Organization Organic Attached
Type of Operation Day Tactical Night Tactical
Planning Low Risk- Caution (35%) High Risk  (68.8%)
Preparatory Time
Adequate - 4 hours to prepare for 
movement but had a 48 hour alert status to 
movement.
Minimal - Smith's men moved into positions 
rapidly.  Foxholes were dug, communication wire 
was laid, and ammo and rations were unloaded 
and distributed.
Guidance
Operation Order guidance given by Gen 








Soldier Preparation Minimal Minimal
Soldier Selection
High Risk - TF Smith required soldiers 
which were not available (50%)
High Risk - TF Smith took reinforcements if 
available and necessary (45%)
Task Routine Complex
Soldier Experience
Untrained - 66% of the soldiers were not 
combat qualified from the previous war and 
were not training in Japan.
MOS qualified - if soldiers survived the battle 
and granted they took a positive experience in 
training and tactics.
Weather High Risk (50%) High Risk (50%)
Visibility/Moisture Rain - Monsoon season in Korea Rain - Monsoon season in Korea
Temperature Range 60-79 Range 60-79
Terrain High Risk (50.7%) High Risk (50.7%)
Trafficability Secondary roads - possible ambush Secondary roads - possible ambush
Type of Terrain
Go (mountains) - series of knolls rising to a 
height of 300 feet above the valley floor and 
straddling the main highway, which rose 
through a saddle between the hills.
NoGo (mountains) - series of knolls rising to a 
height of 300 feet above the valley floor and 
straddling the main highway, which rose through 
a saddle between the hills.
Sustainability High Risk (50.1%) High Risk (53.1%)
Type System
Wheeled vehicles primarily(wheeled 
vehicles left very little protection in 
movement and was weighed heavy as 
causalities) and moved by foot
Wheeled vehicles primarily(wheeled vehicles left 
very little protection in movement and was 
weighed heavy as causalities)
Percentage Personnel 
Fill
Range 80 -100% - 406 soldiers began in the 
battle without attachments.
Range 0-65% - 250 of the 406 soldiers came out 
alive - (lost 35% overall for entire duration of 
battle including the attachments and support).
Logistic Low Risk (94%) High (100%)
Fuel
Green - Maximum that could be 
carried/supplied
Black - no longer a priority as vehicles were 
destroyed
Maintenance
Green - Maximum that could be 
carried/supplied
Black - after salvaging vehicle parts then there 
were no vehicles left.
Ammunition
Green - Maximum that could be 
carried/supplied
Black - rapid expenditure of ammunition against 
the enemy
Food and Water
Green - Maximum that could be 
carried/supplied
Red - Started to look for food en route to camp
Risk Assessment Overall Low Risk (39.2%) Overall  High  (35%)
Stress A lot - for anticipation of engagement (55%) A lot - during the engagement (73%)
Performance Good Performance (46.3%) Good Performance (45%)
Notes:
Nodes typed in blue feed 
into nodes stated above 
in black. Cells filled are nodes not substantiated Cells filled are nodes not substantiated
Nodes type in green are 
the primary nodes of 
concern
Bold words represent states spaces for that 
node.







APPENDIX I  
BATTLE OF MIDWAY SUMMARY SHEET 
Node Before After
Training Trained in MOS but are not practiced Trained in MOS but are not practiced
Duration of Operation 
Under Harsh Conditions
Less Than 6 hours Greater than 2 days
Personal Factors Normal stress level for sailor to 
experience going into battle
High stress level after experiencing live 
ammunition being fired at platform
Leadership Effectiveness
Great - Consistent throughout battle - 
combat experience lacking through the 
chain of command.  
Great - consistent throughout battle - 




Good -Consistent throughout battle 
Spruance replaces Halsey after an skin 
eruption.  Spruance had the respect  of 
his seniors and peers.  He was 
intelligent, adaptable and flexible.  The 
correct mix to counterattack the 
Japanese.
Good -Consistent throughout battle 
Spruance replaces Halsey after an skin 
eruption.  Spruance had the respect  of 
his seniors and peers.  He was intelligent, 




Good - Sailors of the Yorktown in three 
days completed fixing the damage to the 
ship.  Sailors supported the superiors.
Good - Sailors of the Yorktown in three 
days completed fixing the damage to the 
ship.  Sailors supported the superiors.
Relationship with Peers Good -Supportive based on orders
Good -Supportive of each other because 
it was their duty
Level of Exertion
Difficult because the sailors were 
working to fix the damaged Yorktown 
with no recovery time. 
Difficult as time progressed and less 
sleep
Fitness Level Fitness Level 3 Fitness Level 2
Sleep
Rest -Working around the clock to fix the 
carriers and ships, the sailors received 
rest and no deep sleep.
Rest - Working around the clock to fix the 
carriers and ships, the sailors received 
rest and no deep sleep.
Operational Tempo High High 
Threat ThreatCon D ThreatCon D
Mission Control
Low risk by only 8% because of the 
preparation for battle.  Time is a pressing 
factor that could make or break the 
battle.
High Risk
Task Organization Organic Organic 
Training Event Day Tactical Day Tactical
Planning Low Risk-Caution Low Risk - Caution
Preparatory Time Minimal Minimal
Guidance Operation Order Operation Order  
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Node Before After
Sailor Endurance Caution Caution
Environmental Preparation Acclimated Acclimated
Sailor Preparation
Minimal - because the main platform 
was getting repaired by the sailors that 
work it.
Minimal
Sailor Selection Low - sailors of the ships High Risk - replacement after Midway
Task Routine Complex
Sailor Experience
MOS qualified - 90% of the sailors were 
not combat qualified
Highly qualified - if sailors survived the 
battle.
Weather Low Risk Low Risk
Visibility/Moisture Clear/Dry Clear/Dry
Temperature Range 60-79 Range 60-79
Sea Lanes Caution Low Risk
Threat in vicinty of 
Operations
Secondary - sea lanes are crowded to 
engage in sea battle.  Mobility still 
available.
Congested - platforms engaging 
Kamikaze and enemy ships.
Sea State Sea State 2 - ocean has movement
Sea State 3 - ocean has movement and 
causing resistance against the platforms.
Sustainability Low Risk High Risk
Platforms Focus on Carrier Focus on Carrier
Percentage Personnel Fill
Range 80-100% - All sailors are 
accounted for
Range 0-65% -For overall battle range 
would be 66-79% fill
Logistic
Low Risk - can support sailors/pilots 
from a sinking ship
Caution - may have to support 




Yellow - rapid expenditure of ammunition 
against the enemy
Food and Water Green Green
Risk Assessment Overall Low (45.9%) Overall High (54.9%)
Stress
A Lot - for anticipation of engagement 
(38%)
A lot - during the engagement (68.0%)
Performance Good (50.1%) Good (47.6%)
Notes:
Nodes typed in blue feed 
into nodes stated above in 
black. Cells filled are nodes not substantiated Cells filled are nodes not substantiated
Nodes type in green are 
the primary nodes of 
concern
Bold words represent states spaces for 
that node.
Bold words represent states spaces for 
that node.  
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APPENDIX J 
BATTLE OF KURSK SUMMARY SHEET 
Node Before After
Training Trained not Practiced Trained not Practiced
Duration of Operation 
Under Harsh Conditions
7 Days 13 Days
Personal Factors
Normal stress level for soldier to 
experience going into battle
High stress level after experiencing live 
ammunition being fired at oneself
Leadership Effectiveness
Great -Consistent throughout battle - 
Germans followed orders of Adolf Hitler 
(58%)
Average - German effectiveness was 
average at 45% because fear was the 
controlling factor with leadership.
Relationship with Superiors Average - Consistent throughout battle 
Bad - Consistent throughout battle but 
thoughts of Hitler and his methods were in 
the minds of the senior leaderships
Relationship with 
Subordinates
Average - Troops followed orders (out of 
fear)
Bad - Troops followed orders (out of fear)
Relationship with Peers Average - Supportive based on orders
Average - Supportive of each other 
because it was their duty
Level of Exertion Moderate to at the beginning of battle
Difficult as operation progressed and 
less sleep
Fitness Level Fitness Level 2 Fitness Level 3
Sleep Sleep - Rest Sleep - Rest
Operational Tempo High High 
Threat ThreatCon D ThreatCon D
Mission Control Low Risk (39%) High Risk (43%)
Task Organization
Organic - Hitler was trying to develop a 
perfect race, so there would not be any 
attachments with other countries.  
Germany would remain strong from 
within.
Organic - While Hitler was keeping his 
perfect race, he would solicit the country 
to recruit all German males even at young 
years such at 7.
Training Event
Day Tactical - began at first light or 
twilight which was usually around 0230 in 
the morning.
Night Tactical - Soldiers were being 
moved into place during the night.
Planning Low Risk - Caution High Risk (60%)
Preparatory Time Adequate Minimal
Guidance Operation Order FRAGO  
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Node Before After
Soldier Endurance Low Risk Caution
Environmental Preparation Acclimated Acclimated
Soldier Preparation Adequate Minimal
Soldier Selection High Risk - because of the purity of the 
German race
High Risk - maintaining the number of 
soldier within the 3rd Reich
Task Complex Complex
Soldier Experience
MOS qualified - 100% to Reich's 
standards
Highly qualified - if soldiers survived the 
battle.
Weather High Risk (45%) High Risk (45%)
Visibility/Moisture
Rain during the parts of the day and then 
it would stop resulting in the secondary 
roads to become muddy.
Rains during parts of the day
Temperature Range 60-79 Range 60-79
Terrain High Risk (43.5%) High Risk (43.5%)
Trafficability Secondary Trail-Cross Terrain - possible ambush
Type of Terrain Hills  to take Hilltop 226 Hills
Sustainability High Risk (40.7%) High Risk (47.5%)
Type System Tracked Tracked
Percentage Personnel Fill Range 80-100% fill
Range 0-65% fill (soldiers were being 
slaughtered during this battle)
Logistic Low Risk  (85%) High Risk (100%)
Fuel Yellow - necessary for vehicles to move Black - rapid use of fuel for tanks with no 
resupply available
Maintenance Yellow Black - salvaging the tanks was difficult
Ammunition Green Black - rapid expenditure of ammunition 
against the enemy
Food and Water Green Red
Risk Assessment Overall Low Risk  (40.2%) Overall High (34.2%)
Stress A Lot - for anticipation of engagement 
(55%)
A lot - during the engagement (73%)
Performance Good (42.5%) Good (35.6%)
Notes:
Nodes typed in blue feed 
into nodes stated above in 
black. Cells filled are nodes not substantiated Cells filled are nodes not substantiated
Nodes type in green are the 
primary nodes of concern
Bold words represent states spaces for 
that node.
Bold words represent states spaces for 
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